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ABSTRACT 
 The purpose of this study is to better understand the effects participatory pricing 
strategies have on consumer perceptions and behaviors in a sport event pricing scenario. 
Participatory pricing strategies are those that include the consumer in setting the final 
price of a good or service. These mechanisms include name-your-own-price (NYOP) 
and pay-what-you-want (PWYW). These pricing strategies are now being introduced 
into the sport industry. With the increased use of these strategies, and the lack of 
research in sport management pertaining to consumers‟ perceptions of price, specifically 
consumer voice in price setting, there is a gap in the literature that needs to be filled. 
This study investigates the consumer‟s perceptions of price fairness, perceived value, as 
well as consumer behavior (i.e. purchase intentions and willingness-to-pay), when 
encountering participatory pricing strategies. 
 The following dissertation presents a quantitative experimental design, asking 
subjects to participate in a simulated ticket purchase experience. Difference between 
experimental groups was assessed based on price fairness, perceived value, willingness-
to-pay, and purchase intentions. 
 Results indicate there is a significant difference between participatory pricing 
groups and traditional fixed price groups when examining price fairness, perceived  
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value, willingness-to-pay, and final average prices paid. Specifically, price fairness 
evaluations were significantly higher for the PWYW and fixed price groups, and lower 
for the NYOP group. 
 In addition to the price fairness differences, the groups differed on their 
evaluations of perceived value (PWYW and fixed are the same, both higher than 
NYOP). Furthermore, the results reveal that consumers involved in the NYOP 
mechanism evoked higher levels of willingness-to-pay than PWYW and fixed.  
 Furthermore, the study also found that the final average price paid following the 
experiment differed based on the mechanism. The PWYW and fixed price mechanisms 
paid similar amounts, while both of them were significantly higher than the NYOP 
mechanism. This suggests that while one of the biggest concerns for the PWYW 
treatment is a low final average price (even $0), this may not be an issue in a sport ticket 
pricing scenario. Study limitations and future research are included in the following 
dissertation.  
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
 One of the biggest concerns for sport and entertainment event marketers is filling 
venues when there is a low demand for the event. This low demand has been expressed 
by executives of professional sport organizations. Teams are continuing to compete with 
the couch at sporting events. In other words, teams seek ways to make attending a 
sporting event more attractive (i.e. interactive entertainments, tailgating, fan social 
events, etc.) than sitting at home on your couch.   
This competition has not gone unnoticed by professional sport teams. For 
example, teams are beginning to set record low attendance figures (Sport Business 
Daily, 2011). With the prevalence of ticket purchase mechanisms (i.e. team websites, 
secondary ticket markets, on site purchases, etc.), event marketers seek ways to break 
through the proliferation of ticketing outlets to capture as much of the consumer‟s 
expenditures as possible. 
One explanation for unsold tickets is the lack of price acceptability. For example, 
fans may deem the price of a ticket to be too high for an event, especially if it is at an 
adverse time of the week, or against an undesirable opponent (Rascher, McEvoy, Nagel, 
& Brown, 2007). This might cause fans to spend their discretionary income elsewhere, 
or stay at home to watch the game. This unacceptable price for some can reduce the 
demand for that specific game. The problem is, the supply never changes for an event 
(i.e. set number of seats in the facility). This lowered demand with constant supply will 
likely lead to a loss in potential revenue (Winfree & Rosentraub, 2012). 
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Another problem arises when prices remain constant for a low demanded event; 
fans skip the team‟s ticket office and go to other ticket outlets to find price discounts.  
For example, fans might go to the secondary ticket market to purchase those tickets (e.g. 
StubHub, Ticket Exchanges, or Ebay). The problem is that those fans selling the tickets 
purchased the tickets at a slightly lower price than face value, and are also seeking a 
profit from the exchange. This can cause the prices to be cheaper, but not all of the time. 
When consumers are not able to receive price discounts to lower demanded 
games, the team will likely struggle with attendance. In today‟s sport industry, marketers 
are realizing the need for optimal pricing of goods and services, and constantly seeking 
to determine what that looks like. Some of these teams have tried variable ticket pricing 
(Rascher et al., 2007). In this scenario, teams change the price of the ticket based on 
several variables (i.e. day of the week, opponent, etc.). Regardless of the variable 
causing the price change, the change is based on demand. If the consumer demand is 
increased, so will the price. One of the biggest downsides to this pricing mechanism is 
that these prices are based on historical figures and are set at the beginning of the season.  
A problem may arise with the variable ticket pricing scenario when demand for a 
game changes midseason (i.e. team begins to have a losing season). There is a possibility 
demand might also change, along with the consumers‟ price tolerance. The 
consequences of this would likely be low attendance at potentially high demanded 
games. Some teams like the idea of changing the price based on the demand for the 
game, but do not implement variable ticket pricing. These teams sometimes use dynamic 
pricing. In this scenario, teams make changes to the price of the ticket relatively close to 
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the game‟s start time. In other words, by offering a dollar or two off, the teams would try 
to change the demand for that individual game while leaving the base price constant for 
future games. 
Consider a situation where fans deem the fixed price to be too much for the 
characteristics of that game (e.g. weeknight, poor opponent, or a poor win/loss 
percentage). From a supply and demand perspective, event marketers understand that 
their demand is low and by keeping their price fixed they will likely have fewer 
purchases (assuming they have an elastic demand curve). Therefore, they want to 
increase demand and encourage people to come to the game. Traditionally, sport teams 
would offer discounts for unsold seating sections (Leeds & Von Allmen, 2011). Teams 
may make this part of a packaged deal (e.g. family night – four tickets, four hot dogs, 
and four drinks for a fixed-price). Regardless of the discounting method, the team 
realizes that if they do not change their prices, consumers may try to find the tickets 
elsewhere (i.e. secondary ticket market), or find something else to do that night.  
In addition to issues of supply and demand, event promoters also realize that if 
the fan buys the ticket, the fan will also likely spend money on other revenue generating 
items at the facility (i.e. parking, concessions, merchandise, etc.). Several scholars have 
argued that the marginal cost for sport events (i.e. the cost of allowing one more fan into 
the event) is close to zero until the facility is sold to capacity (Alexander, 2001; Leeds & 
Von Allmen, 2011). In other words, if event marketers give fans a price break, it will 
cost the team very little (until the facility is sold out), compared to if no discount was 
given and the fan did not purchase the ticket. 
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Regardless of the supply and demand of an event, both fans and sport 
organizations are looking for a reasonable price; one that is deemed as being fair by both  
parties (dual entitlement theory; Haws & Bearden, 2006). Both sides also want the 
consumer to come to the game and have a good time. However, the team needs to find a 
way to give the fan a price they deem as being fair, and get the fan to purchase through 
the team box office/website.  
One way this problem has been solved in other industries is through participatory 
pricing strategies. So, what would happen if the team involves the fan in setting the price 
for the ticket? Would the fan be more likely to purchase the ticket? Would they find the 
price to be fair? Would they value the good or service? How much would the fan be 
willing to pay? These questions are the basis for the current study. Therefore, the 
purpose of this study is to better understand the effects participatory pricing strategies 
have on consumer perceptions and behaviors in a sport event pricing scenario.  
Statement of the Problem 
 In the current sport pricing landscape, traditional fixed-price strategies are 
typically used. In this situation sport organizations set a price for a good or service. 
Here, the consumer is asked to pay a price, with little or no say in how that price was set. 
The only time that this price will change is if the sport organization changes it by 
implementing variable ticket pricing, dynamic pricing, or price discounts. 
 Currently used in several industries, participatory pricing gives the consumer a 
say in the final price they pay. Two of the primary methods of participatory pricing 
include Name-Your-Own-Price (NYOP) and Pay-What-You-Want (PWYW) pricing 
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strategies. The first method, NYOP, has primarily been used in the tourism industry. In 
this pricing mechanism, a third party retailer is commonly used. For example, airlines, 
hotels, and rental car agencies often give Priceline.com (third party retailer in the 
tourism industry) the right to sell low demanded inventory at a discounted rate. Priceline 
then gives consumers the opportunity to bid on an opaque good or service (Anderson & 
Wilson, 2011). Opaqueness means the consumer does not know who the company 
offering the good or service is, or any specific details about the good or service. The 
consumer only knows that they will be traveling or staying on a certain date with a 
certain level of quality.  
The advantage for the NYOP manufacturer (i.e. sport and entertainment event 
promoter, airline, hotel, or rental car agency) is they are selling goods and services that 
without the NYOP retailer may not have sold at all. The manufacturer also has a certain 
price they require from the retailer for each item sold (Hinz & Spann, 2008). The 
advantage to the consumer is a lower price for a good or service, with the inconvenience 
of not knowing the full details about the good or service they purchase.  
 The NYOP mechanism has been seen in the sport industry. For example, event 
ticket retailer, ScoreBig.com, sells tickets (both sport and entertainment) through a 
NYOP mechanism. Individual teams have also attempted to use this pricing mechanism 
to sell individual and season tickets to fans (i.e. NHL‟s Florida Panthers & St. Louis 
Blues). However, team use of the NYOP mechanism has been limited. 
 A second type of participatory pricing strategy used across industries is PWYW. 
This mechanism has primarily been used in the music and restaurant industries. In this 
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scenario, consumers are asked to offer a dollar amount for the good or service, and 
regardless of the perceived value, the firm accepts the price (Kim, Natter, & Spann, 
2009). The PWYW mechanism takes the entire price setting control away from the firm. 
This is likely the reason PWYW has rarely been used. However, several researchers 
have found that implementing PWYW pricing into a firm‟s offerings increases consumer 
perceptions, as well as profit (Kim et al., 2009; Kim, Natter, & Spann, 2010). The 
PWYW pricing mechanism has only been implemented by one sport organization (as far 
as the current research is aware): Mansfield Town Football Club in the United Kingdom. 
Here, the PWYW pricing mechanism was used to boost attendance for one game, but 
attendance consequently increased for the rest of the season (Daily Mail, 2010; F.C. 
Business, 2010).  
 These two participatory pricing mechanisms have shown success in various 
industries, and are currently being used in the sport industry. In addition, sport marketers 
constantly seek to elicit positive consumer perceptions and behaviors through their 
pricing strategies. Therefore, an investigation is needed to assess whether participatory 
pricing strategies are feasible for sport event ticketing, and whether these strategies 
evoke positive consumer price perceptions. In addition, Petrick (2004) suggests that 
“future research should determine which attributes have the most effect on quality, 
perceived value, and inevitably repurchase behavior” (p. 37). The current study sought to 
investigate these variables as it relates to participatory pricing mechanisms currently 
being used in the sport ticket industry. 
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Based on this need, the purpose of this study is to better understand the effects 
participatory pricing strategies have on consumer perceptions and behaviors in a sport 
event pricing scenario. Specifically, this study sought to determine the effect innovative 
participatory pricing strategies (e.g. NYOP & PWYW) have on consumer perceptions of 
price fairness, perceived value, willingness-to-pay, and purchase intentions. 
Theoretical Background 
The pricing literature in today‟s sport marketing academy has focused primarily 
on price determination (Rascher et al., 2007; Reese & Mittelstadt, 2001; Rishe & 
Mondello, 2003) and the secondary ticket market (Drayer & Shapiro, 2009; Drayer, 
Stotlar, & Irwin, 2008). However, this literature is not void of issues of price perceptions 
(e.g. Drayer & Shapiro, 2011), including price fairness (Drayer et al., 2008; Greenwell, 
2007; Greenwell et al., 2008). Some of the prominent price perception and purchase 
constructs developed in the business and tourism industries include price fairness, 
perceived value, willingness-to-pay, and purchase intentions. 
Extant literature in the business and tourism industries have focused on price 
perceptions, specifically price fairness (e.g. equity theory, procedural justice, distributive 
justice, dual entitlement theory, assimilation-contrast theory, & transaction utility 
theory). Studies focusing on procedural justice have shown that by giving consumers a 
say in the price of a good or service, firms are likely increasing the consumer‟s 
perceptions of price fairness (Greenwell et al., 2008; Haws & Bearden, 2006; Park, Ellis, 
Kim, & Prideaux, 2010). Furthermore, if firms are able to involve the consumer in the 
price setting process, they will be able to increase consumers‟ willingness-to-pay, 
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perceived value, and loyalty (Park et al., 2010). However, there is a paucity of literature 
pertaining to these different types of pricing mechanisms. Therefore, there is a gap in 
sport pricing literature that deals with consumer perceptions of pricing control. Thus, 
this study uses theories developed from the price fairness literature (specifically 
procedural justice) to better understand the role consumer involvement in price setting 
has in evaluating purchase experiences.  
Kim et al. (2009) suggested that the ratio of inputs to outputs (distributive 
justice) is also dependent on the relationship the buyer has with the seller. Greenwell et 
al. (2008) echoed this idea when they suggested that sport is unique in studying price 
fairness due to the emotional connections fans have with the team and players. In other 
words, fan‟s perceptions of equitability (ratio of inputs to outputs) can depend on the 
consumer‟s connection to the team. By applying social identity theory, one could argue 
that fans want to be associated with a team‟s identity, and therefore will do anything 
they can to support that identity, including changing perceptions of equity in an 
exchange (distributive justice). Furthermore, Oliver (1980) found that previous 
interactions with a good or service influences the perceptions of consumers after their 
purchase. Likewise, according to the theory of social relationships, if consumers have a 
relationship with the firm, they will likely behave in a way that leads to approval by the 
firm and peers associated with it (i.e. fans; Kim et al., 2009).  All of these theoretical 
assumptions could suggest there is a relationship between consumer perceptions and 
price fairness. 
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Rationale for the Study 
The sport industry is a viable place to implement participatory pricing for three 
reasons. First, NYOP and PWYW have been successful in the tourism and music 
industries. In both of these industries firms have a low marginal cost. Therefore, because 
sport events also have a low marginal cost (Alexander, 2001; Leeds & Von Allmen, 
2011), the sport ticket industry may qualify as a candidate for these mechanisms. For 
example, if the consumer pays nothing (a possibility in PWYW pricing) or less than the 
fixed-price method (NYOP) for the ticket, there are relatively small costs to the sport 
organization. In other words, the cost of admitting one extra person is relatively low for 
sport organizations, until the venue is at full capacity (Alexander, 2001; Leeds & Von 
Allmen, 2011). 
Second, because NYOP and PWYW mechanisms may require the consumer to 
pay less per ticket, the consumer may have a surplus, compared to purchasing the ticket 
through traditional pricing mechanisms. Likewise, a lower price per ticket may lower the 
overall cost of attendance, causing the consumers to purchase more auxiliary goods and 
services (i.e. concessions and merchandise; Leeds & Von Allmen, 2011; Rascher et al., 
2007; Winfree & Rosentraub, 2012). Therefore, the deficit between the face value (retail 
price) of the ticket and the price actually paid, may increase revenues in other areas of 
the sport venue. This can be measured by examining spending amounts of those who 
participate in setting their price, and those that use traditional fixed price mechanisms. 
Third, by implementing NYOP and PWYW pricing, sport organizations give 
consumers the ability to set their own price. There are numerous examples of positive 
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price fairness associated with giving consumers price setting power (Greenwell et al., 
2008; Haws & Bearden, 2006; Park et al., 2010). Therefore, applying participatory 
pricing to a sport event context may be beneficial to the sport organization by increasing 
revenue, as well as positive consumer price perceptions. 
The following managerial questions influence the literature review, hypothesis 
formation, and statistical methodology: How do participatory pricing strategies change 
consumer‟s perceptions and behavior in a sport event ticket purchase scenario? In other 
words, do fans have greater perceptions of price fairness when exposed to participatory 
pricing? Does participatory pricing influence value perceptions? Finally, how does 
participatory influence consumer behavior (e.g. willingness-to-pay and purchase 
intentions)?  
Based on the aforementioned questions, this study sought to investigate these 
four constructs: a) price fairness, b) perceived value, c) willingness-to-pay, and d) 
purchase intentions. This study used multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) to 
analyze these four constructs. 
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Overview of the Dissertation 
This dissertation has been divided into six chapters. The current chapter has 
discussed the purpose of this study, theoretical background, and rationale for the study. 
Chapter II will review the current landscape of literature on sport pricing, participatory 
pricing strategies, price fairness, perceived value, willingness-to-pay, and purchase 
intentions. In addition to the literature overview, Chapter II presents five hypotheses are 
developed from the literature. Chapter III explains the proposed methodology to be used 
to test the hypotheses. Specifically, a rationale for the use of MANOVA, analysis of 
variance (ANOVA), and experimental design is presented. Chapter IV is a presentation 
of the findings. In addition, sample demographics are presented. Following the results, 
Chapter V presents a discussion of the findings. This chapter includes possible 
implications, limitations, and potential future research endeavors. Finally, Chapter VI 
provides a conclusion to the dissertation. 
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CHAPTER II 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
The purpose of this study is to better understand the effects participatory pricing 
strategies have on consumer perceptions and behaviors in a sport event pricing scenario. 
This chapter consists of a review of the literature pertaining to participatory pricing 
mechanisms and consumer perceptions and behavior. Throughout this chapter, five 
hypotheses are presented, all which have been informed by extant literature. The first 
section examines the theoretical foundations of price fairness, and explains its 
application to the current study. The second section reviews the theoretical foundations 
of participatory pricing strategies, as well as their current use. This section is the most in 
depth due to its importance to the current study. The third section examines the 
conceptualization of consumer value perceptions. The fourth section explains the various 
theoretical foundations to evaluating consumer‟s willingness-to-pay for a good or 
service. The sixth section explores the various elements of purchase intentions. Finally, 
the last section provides a summary of the chapter.  
Price Fairness 
Of all of the theories that fall within the realm of consumer price perceptions, 
price fairness seems to be one of the most commonly used. Price fairness is concerned 
with the emotions and associations consumers have when comparing the price paid to 
other seller‟s prices (Xia, Monroe, & Cox, 2004). Petrick (2005) also suggests that price 
fairness can be derived from the consumer comparing the price paid to the internal 
reference price of that consumer. Price fairness comes from at least four separate 
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theories: equity theory, distributive justice, procedural justice, and dual entitlement 
theory (Xia et al., 2004). After providing a definition of price fairness, these 
underpinning theories are discussed. A graphical representation of these parent theories 
is shown in Figure 2.1. 
 
Figure 2.1: Price fairness parent theories 
 
 
 
Price Fairness Defined 
Because price fairness has many roots, Xia et al. (2004) felt there was a need to 
synthesize the price fairness literature so that researchers would be better able to 
understand and use it. In Xia et al.‟s (2004) conceptualization of price fairness, they 
defined it as, “a consumer‟s assessment and associated emotions of whether the 
difference (or lack of difference) between a seller‟s price and the price of a comparative 
other party is reasonable, acceptable, or justifiable” (p. 3). In other words, negative 
Social Comparison 
Literature 
Equity Theory 
Distributive Justice 
Procedural Justice 
Dual Entitlement 
Theory 
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emotions will arise if consumers find the actual price paid to be different from others. 
Sometimes when consumers come out the “winner” in an exchange relationship (i.e. pay 
less than what they deem as being fair) they will view the good or service as having a 
higher quality (Oh, 2003). 
Some have argued that studying price fairness in sport is somewhat more 
challenging than in other industries. Greenwell et al. (2008) suggested that this is due to 
the strong emotional connection sports fans have with teams and players. For example, 
what other type of good or service can evoke emotions strong enough to attach 
themselves to its success (BIRGing – basking in reflective glory) and to detach from its 
failures (CORFing – cutting off reflective failure; Wann & Branscombe, 1990)? In 
addition, Greenwell et al. (2008) also suggested price fairness studies in sport are unique 
because sport consumers have fewer options. With fewer options comes more attention 
to individual organizations within that industry. So as prices change, consumers are 
more aware and become more sensitive to fairness issues. In summary, regardless of the 
study or approach used, it is argued that sport marketing researchers need to be aware of 
the uniqueness of price fairness in the sport industry. 
Equity Theory & Other Price Fairness Theories 
The discussion of the four founding theories of price fairness should begin with 
equity theory because the other three are built upon this parent theory (see Figure 1.1). 
Equity theory comes from the overarching social comparison theory (Park et al., 2010), 
and is concerned with the ratio of inputs to outputs, compared to similar peers (Xia et al., 
2004). Equity theory suggests that resources should be dispersed to all exchange parties 
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equitably, not necessarily equally (Kim et al., 2009). In other words, if one consumer 
puts forth a certain effort (i.e. price) more than another consumer, they should receive a 
greater benefit (utility) from that exchange. Put another way, a consumer‟s inputs (i.e. 
prices paid) should be equitable with their outputs (i.e. good or service) received. 
Distributive justice comes from equity theory (Oh, 2003; Park et al., 2010). This 
is very similar to equity theory in that it is based on a comparison of an outcome to 
other‟s outcomes (Xia et al., 2004). However, distributive justice does not take into 
account exchange parties‟ relationships. According to Kim et al. (2009) the relationship 
between the seller and buyer will influence both parties‟ perceptions of equity. 
Distributive justice posits that consumers make decisions about their ratio of input to 
outputs by examining what other consumers in the same class of product purchases 
obtain.  
Dual entitlement theory is based on the concept that both sides of an exchange 
relationship should be entitled to equitable outcomes. Dual entitlement theory is based 
on the alignment of a firm‟s costs to consumer prices (Bolton & Alba, 2006). In other 
words, in a purchase exchange, Bolton and Alba (2006) suggest that price increases 
should match cost increases. Haws and Bearden (2006) propose that dual entitlement 
theory argues firms are entitled to a reasonable (fair) profit, while consumers are entitled 
to a reasonable (fair) price. In other words, if a firm increases their prices without 
showing their costs have increased, the consumer will likely find the price to be unfair, 
and in turn “punish” the firm by not purchasing the good or service or spreading ill 
word-of-mouth (Mazumdar, Raj, & Sinha, 2005). 
  
16 
 
Just as Greenwell et al. (2008) suggested that the sport industry is unique in price 
fairness assessments due to consumer connections with the team and players, they also 
suggested that fans in the sport industry have fewer options. Due to being more likely to 
have fewer options, sport consumers are able to see price changes better than in other 
industries. Another example of this in the sport industry is when owners of teams claim 
that price increases are due to increased player salaries. The problem arises when 
researchers, such as Rishe and Mondello (2003), find that ticket prices are not 
significantly affected by player salaries. This has been termed “blowing smoke” in the 
faces of fans (Rishe & Mondello, 2003). In summary, if the price does not align with the 
cost incurred by the firm, unfairness perceptions will likely occur (Bolton & Alba, 
2006). 
Procedural Justice 
The parent theory for procedural justice is also equity theory and is the focal 
theory in this study. However, procedural justice is quite different than distributive 
justice and equity theory. Procedural justice is concerned with the amount of 
involvement all stakeholders (i.e. consumers) have in the decision making process (Park 
et al., 2010; Xia et al., 2004). Park et al. (2010) suggested that by including consumers in 
the price setting process, firms give them a voice. In pricing, this is concerned with 
whether or not consumers feel they had some control over the way prices were set. 
Researchers in sport (Greenwell et al., 2008), tourism (Park et al., 2010), and business 
(Haws & Bearden, 2006; Kim et al., 2010) have found that when firms involve the 
consumer in the price setting process in some way, the consumer tends to deem the price 
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to be more fair, and in turn, they have increased purchase intentions. Based on the 
aforementioned findings, it is believed that price fairness evaluations will be 
significantly different when participatory pricing strategies are implemented, giving 
consumers a say in the final price they pay. 
Hypothesis 1: Price fairness evaluations will be significantly different between 
experimental groups. 
Price Fairness & Participatory Pricing 
Kim et al. (2009) suggested that NYOP and PWYW pricing strategies are 
innovative because they are different from the traditional fixed-price mechanisms. In 
NYOP and PWYW, consumers get a say in their price (procedural justice). In other 
words, consumers will pay what they want in relation to what they deem fair (Muzumdar 
et al., 2005). If firms are offering a good or service that provides the consumer utility 
(transaction utility theory), then the consumer will likely pay what they would in a fixed-
price scenario, if not slightly more (see Kim et al., 2009). For example, Kim et al. (2009) 
found that firms using PWYW received 104% of their normal price. Therefore, if the 
firm is able to offer a good or service that the consumer deems as being of high utility, 
they are likely to induce higher prices, and may be able to be successful at PWYW 
pricing.  
Kim et al. (2010) applied price fairness to their study of participatory pricing 
strategies. Kim et al. (2010) found that when the consumer was allowed to participate in 
price setting, they had higher levels of fairness. Therefore, based on the theoretical 
assumptions of procedural justice and the findings of multiple researchers attempting to 
  
18 
 
understand price fairness using consumer control (Greenwell et al., 2008; Kim et al., 
2010), one could argue that participatory pricing mechanism preference will directly 
influence price fairness evaluations. 
Even though much of the sport pricing literature deals with price determination, 
Greenwell et al. (2008) examined price fairness when they discussed overall consumer 
satisfaction. Greenwell et al. (2008) suggested that sport marketing literature should 
focus more on the value consumers place on ticket policies. Therefore, the current study 
seeks to answer this call by investigating the relationship between price fairness 
perceptions, as they relate to participatory pricing ticket policies, and consumer‟s 
perceived value.  
According to Kim et al. (2009), consumers are only willing to pay what they 
deem as being fair. Therefore, price fairness levels are higher for consumers who value 
the purchase. Furthermore, Xu, Goegebuure, and Heijden (2006) found that consumer 
perceptions of benefits had a positive impact on quality. Based on the current study‟s 
conceptualization of perceived value (which includes quality), one can argue that Xu et 
al.‟s (2006) proposition might identify a relationship between price fairness and 
perceived value. Finally, Bojanic (1996) found that consumer perceptions of price has a 
positive relationship with perceived quality, and therefore, with perceived value.  An 
overview of the price fairness literature examined in this chapter is displayed in Table 
2.1. 
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Table 2.1:  
Overview of price fairness literature 
  
Authors Central Thesis Key Findings/Summary 
Bolton & Alba (2006) Price fairness 
associated with firm 
cost and price 
- Consumers deem a price to be fair if it 
is in line with the costs the firm 
(vendor) incurs.  
Greenwell, Brownlee, 
Jordan, & Popp (2008) 
Importance of 
customer voice and 
choice on satisfaction 
- Sport organizations should give 
stakeholders some control over setting 
the price in order to increase fairness 
and satisfaction. 
Haws & Bearden 
(2006) 
Dynamic pricing and 
price fairness 
- Auctions reduced the likelihood of 
price unfairness. 
- When consumers participate in price 
discovery they have higher levels of 
perceived fairness and satisfaction. 
Kim, Natter, & Spann 
(2010) 
PWYW Success - Participative pricing can lead to 
perceptions of control. This leads to 
perceptions of price fairness. 
Oh (2003) Price fairness‟ effect 
on overall price, 
quality, and value 
- Consumer‟s evaluations of value and 
quality are influences by their 
perceived gain or loss (i.e. price 
fairness).  
Park, Ellis, Kim, & 
Prideaux (2010) 
The effect of 
consumer input in 
price setting on price 
fairness 
- Public input into price setting of fees 
was an essential predictor of social 
equity (i.e. price fairness). 
- In order to increase price fairness, 
consumer repeat use should reap price 
reductions for the repeat users.  
Xia, Monroe, & Cox 
(2004) 
Conceptual 
framework of price 
fairness 
- Theoretical foundations of price 
fairness. 
- Unfairness is related to negative 
emotions. 
- Price differentiation without product 
customization leads to unfairness 
perceptions. 
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Participatory Pricing Strategies 
The extant literature discussing the use of innovative pricing strategies, 
specifically those that give consumers a say in the price of goods and services, involve 
two main threads of research: name-your-own-price (NYOP) and pay-what-you-want 
(PWYW). These research avenues have been examined extensively in the context of 
their purpose and form (Amaldoss & Jain, 2008; Anderson & Wilson, 2011; Chandran & 
Morwitz, 2005; Chernev, 2003; Fay, 2009; Hinz & Spann, 2010; Hinz, Hann, & Spann, 
2011; Kanna & Kopalle, 2001; Kim et al., 2009; Kim et al., 2010; Mills & Law, 2001; 
Raju & Zhang, 2010; Shapiro & Zillante, 2009; Wang, Gal-Or, & Chatterjee, 2009), 
consumer bidding behavior (Bernhardt & Spann, 2010; Fay & Laran, 2009; Fay, 2004; 
Hinz & Spann, 2008; Spann & Tellis, 2006; Terwiesch, Savin, & Hann, 2005; Wolk & 
Spann, 2008), and optimal participatory pricing design (Anderson, 2009; Cai, Chao, & 
Li, 2009; Spann, Zeithammer, & Haubl, 2010; Wilson & Zhang, 2008). The following 
section will be structured based on these research avenues.  
Purpose 
What Are Participatory Pricing Strategies? 
Sport teams realize not all of their tickets will be in high demand (e.g. day 
games, weekday games, opponents, etc.; Rascher et al., 2007). To combat this problem, 
many sport organizations take steps to increase consumption (attendance). One way this 
is done is through price discounts. While price discounts have been shown to be 
successful by inducting purchase behavior, some firms are moving to a more innovative 
strategy; participatory pricing (Kim et al., 2009). While there have been many 
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investigations into participatory pricing, an investigation into the avenues for 
participatory pricing in sport event ticketing is needed. 
A type of pricing strategy being used in the tourism industry is yield 
management. Perdue (2002) defined yield management as “the application of 
information systems and pricing strategies to sell the right capacity to the right customer 
at the right time” (p. 16). According to Malighetti, Paleari, and Renato (2010), yield 
management is also called revenue management or dynamic pricing.  
 According to Perdue (2002), the process of implementing yield management is 
relatively simple. The process begins with the proper identification of a target market 
and then an appropriate price structure to fit that target segment (Perdue, 2002). Petrick 
(2005) discusses this price structure in his examination of price sensitive consumers in 
the cruise industry. Petrick (2005) suggested that airlines are the most innovative in 
implementing this strategy. Furthermore, he posits that yield management is effective 
because it requires consumers to pay more when the demand is higher. Therefore, setting 
an appropriate price structure based on your target segment is essential in yield 
management. The second step involves the firm to determine what the best time frame is 
for implementation by forecasting demand. Finally, the firm then identifies the highest 
price for the good or service, and “available capacity is allocated to „price buckets,‟ a 
target number of units to be sold at each price” (Perdue, 2002, p. 16).  
Several innovative pricing strategies are being implemented into yield 
management systems in the tourism industry; participatory pricing strategies. According 
to Kim et al. (2009), “innovative pricing models can be anything that is different from 
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the usual way of setting the price for a specific product” (p. 44). Therefore, NYOP and 
PWYW strategies can be considered innovative because of their unconventional format 
(Kim et al., 2009). Other participatory pricing methods could be both recognized and 
regulated methods, such as: negotiations, reverse pricing, and other auctions (Chandran 
& Morwitz, 2005). 
Name-Your-Own-Price. A commonly used participatory pricing strategy for the 
service industry is that of name-your-own-price (NYOP). According to Chernev (2003), 
NYOP is considered a type of reverse pricing. Reverse pricing differs from other 
auctions in that consumers do not have a reference price for which they can begin their 
bidding, beyond the fixed-price of similar goods or services (i.e. the regular price of a 
hotel for that night). In other words, some suggest that consumers are overtly stating 
what they are willing to pay for the desired good or service in NYOP mechanisms 
(Chernev, 2003). Therefore, it can be concluded that NYOP strategies are an innovative, 
regulated, reverse pricing mechanism. 
In reverse pricing, consumers participate in the setting of prices paid (Kim et al., 
2009). When these mechanisms are used the consumer submits a bid on a good or 
service, and if that price is above a secret threshold price pre-determined by the seller, it 
is accepted and a purchase is made (Bernhardt & Spann, 2010; Fay, 2009). In addition to 
the seller not disclosing their secret threshold price, in NYOP the seller does not give the 
consumer an option to the specific service they are receiving. For example, if a 
consumer uses Priceline to bid on a trip from Los Angeles to New York, they are not 
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bidding on an individual flight, but rather a day and price. This information gives the 
NYOP purchase an element of opaqueness.  
Amaldoss and Jain (2008) explain that the NYOP strategy for airline tickets give 
the consumer a chance to receive a lower discount, but that they are losing control over 
the type of service. They suggest that when Priceline sells an airline ticket, the consumer 
does not know “exact flight times, number of stops, or even the name of the airline” 
(Amaldoss & Jain, 2008, p. 1686). Due to the opaqueness of the traditional NYOP 
mechanism, consumers are often brand agnostic and less concerned with being loyal to a 
specific brand (Anderson & Wilson, 2011).  
At the core of revenue management, pricing strategies seek to maximize seller 
profits by capturing consumer spending. In addition, firms must recognize their 
competition, and how the firm‟s pricing strategies affect the other goods and services it 
makes (i.e. cannibalization; Kim et al., 2009). Therefore, NYOP mechanisms should 
take both of these issues into account. First, when firms use NYOP strategies they are 
able to attract price sensitive consumers, who they may not have reached through 
traditional fixed-price strategies (Anderson & Wilson, 2011). This is because price 
sensitive consumers often make purchase decisions based on the price of a good or 
service (Lichtenstein, Bloch, & Black, 1988; Petrick, 2005). Therefore, when price 
sensitive consumers are giving price setting ability, they are letting consumers find the 
best price available, increasing their intent to purchase. However, the potential negative 
effects of attracting price sensitive consumers has been investigated by several 
researchers. For example, Petrick (2005) suggested that loyal consumers may be less 
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price sensitive. This suggests that, because price promotions are aimed at infrequent 
patrons, these strategies are likely to attract price sensitive consumers. According to 
Han, Gupta, and Lehmann (2001), price sensitive consumers can be more effected by 
price promotions than other types of promotions. For example, Han et al. (2001) posit 
that when there are promotions implemented to engage in competition, losses are of 
bigger concern than gains. This greater loss is explained by the value function of 
prospect theory. In short, while price sensitive consumers are drawn to the NYOP 
pricing strategy, if the firm is not able to provide a gain for the consumer (the lowest 
acceptable bid), they will likely have issues gaining discretionary spending from that 
group in the future. In other words, if the bidder feel they could have gotten a cheaper 
price by bidding lower, they may deem it as a loss, and therefore causing the NYOP 
strategy to become detrimental to the consumer‟s evaluation of the firm.  
Second, firms are protecting themselves from cannibalization by not publishing 
their secret threshold price. Unlike other auctions, NYOP retailers never publish 
threshold prices to other firms or buyers (Bernhardt & Spann, 2010). Therefore, 
consumers do not know the price the firm is willing to take for the good or service, 
giving the firm the ability to change the price of the good or service without the 
consumer knowing. This decreases the risk of cannibalizing the current firm offerings. 
Participatory pricing methods (i.e. NYOP & PWYW) are innovative ways of 
increasing firm revenue by extracting buyer surplus, and increasing their willingness to 
pay (Spann & Tellis, 2006). This is done by fulfilling low demand goods and services 
(e.g. sport event tickets at games with historically low attendance), while also giving 
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consumers a say in the price they pay. Name-your-own-price firms will rarely set their 
secret threshold price below their marginal cost (the cost associated with allowing one 
more person into the event) because it would not be profitable. Unlike traditional fixed-
price strategies where the consumer must pay a set price, NYOP firms gain previously 
uncaptured consumer spending, and receive a price above their marginal costs to 
produce that good or service. The NYOP strategy “marks the return of one-to-one 
negotiations between buyers and sellers” (Mills & Law, 2001, p. 98). 
One of the pioneering firms to use NYOP mechanisms in any industry is 
Priceline. To date, Priceline is one of the only successful long-term users of NYOP, but 
this has only been seen in the travel industry (e.g. hotel, airfare, and rental cars) (Wang 
et al., 2009). When Priceline first began, they had several different product categories. In 
2001, Priceline included several categories of NYOP goods and services: hotel rooms, 
airline tickets, telephone service, financing services, cars (rental and new), groceries, and 
gas (Kanna & Kopalle, 2001; Mills & Law, 2001). While Priceline was mainly in the 
information business (giving consumers the price separate from the product themselves; 
Kanna & Kopalle, 2001), their influence as a third party retailer on the tourism industry 
was incredible. In 2005, Priceline saw revenues of $2 billion, and $4 billion in 2007 
(Amaldoss & Jain, 2008).  
Currently, Priceline‟s ability to be successful depends on their capacity to sell 
low demanded airline tickets, hotel rooms, and rental cars. Other products offered by 
Priceline were not successful due to the limited profits gained from their offering (Kanna 
& Kopalle, 2001; Mills & Law, 2001). Airlines, hotels, and rental car agencies send their 
  
26 
 
goods and services to Priceline only when they are unable to sell them at a higher price 
through other distribution channels (Amaldoss & Jain, 2008). Therefore, we can 
consider NYOP retailers to be third party administrators (e.g. Priceline) retailers, and the 
producers of the good or service to be the manufacturers (e.g. airlines, hotels, and rental 
car agencies). The traditional process that occurs when NYOP strategies are used begins 
with the manufacturer offering the retailer a perishable good to sell. Some researchers 
argue that Priceline goes beyond the role of an arranger, but rather serves as a market 
maker (Ding, Eliashberg, Huber, & Saini, 2005).  
One event ticketing firm (ScoreBig.com) has become a NYOP pioneer in the 
sport and entertainment industry. ScoreBig‟s model is very similar to the NYOP retailers 
seen in today‟s tourism industry; teams and event promoters partner ScoreBig to sell 
unused event tickets (A. Burnham, personal communication, January 5, 2012). In their 
model, the manufacturers (i.e. sport and entertainment events) work with ScoreBig to 
sell tickets to consumers using a NYOP mechanism. According to ScoreBig (2011), their 
business model is unique to the sport and entertainment industry, and beneficial to both 
the consumer and the event promoter. For example, they suggest that through their 
pricing model, consumers are able to try new things without spending a lot. On the other 
hand, event promoters are able to sell unused inventory. Selling unused inventory is 
essential; especially sense every year 40% of event tickets are not sold (ScoreBig, 2011). 
According to BusinessWire.com (2011): 
ScoreBig has proven itself to be a category-defining company with a model that 
for the first time, works collaboratively with the industry to safely and 
  
27 
 
dynamically sell tickets below retail price, while also serving to increase the 
affordability of attending live events for fans. 
Pay-What-You-Want. One pricing method that service oriented firms are 
beginning to implement is pay-what-you-want (PWYW) pricing. This method is 
considered a participatory pricing method because it gives the consumer complete 
control over the price they will pay (Kim et al., 2009). By giving the consumer this 
ability, the firm is able to learn more about the consumer (i.e. willingness to pay, 
fairness, etc.), as well as create an exchange where the consumer is almost guaranteed to 
be satisfied with the price they pay. According to Raju and Zhang (2010), PWYW 
pricing gives the firm the ability to expand “the market to the broadest possible size 
without giving too much of a break to those who are happy to pay a higher price” (p. 
22). This means consumers are paying what they desire to pay, no more, no less. 
Raju and Zhang (2010) argued that firms typically use PWYW pricing to drive 
business or because it could yield greater revenue than that of traditional methods, or 
both. This type of participatory pricing mechanism is seen primarily in two major 
industries, the restaurant and music industries. The reason these two industries are 
optimal for PWYW pricing is because: a) they are service industries with b) excess 
supply potential and c) have low marginal costs (Kim et al., 2010). Therefore, the sport 
industry is possibly an ideal place for PWYW pricing implementation, specifically sport 
events. Sport events are considered sport services (Shank, 2009), having excessive 
supply (especially when events have low attendance/demand), and have a low marginal 
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cost (Alexander, 2001, Leeds & Von Allmen, 2011). This will be explained briefly 
hereafter. 
Alexander (2001) stated, “the marginal cost of admitting an additional fan is 
probably constant and relatively low for all teams, at least up to stadium capacity, and 
therefore is not likely to vary with changes in quantity” (p. 346). Furthermore, Leeds and 
Von Allmen (2011) suggest that the marginal cost for admitting an extra fan to a 
sporting event is near zero. “It costs the team relatively little to sell one more ticket and 
to admit and clean up after one more fan” (Leeds & Von Allmen, 2011, p. 33). The only 
time the marginal cost is well above zero is when the capacity of the facility is full 
(Leeds & Von Allmen, 2011). Therefore, according to Kim et al. (2010), firms should 
not use PWYW pricing if their goods and services have a high level of value or cost. In 
other words, sport events should only use participatory pricing mechanisms when they 
have a low marginal cost and have excess supply (i.e. tickets unsold).  
Attracting new customers has been one of the primary objectives of any pricing 
promotion, regardless of type (Mullin, Hardy, & Sutton, 2007). This is no different in 
PWYW pricing. According to Kim et al. (2010), PWYW can give the firm the ability to 
engage with a consumer group concerned with trying new goods or services. By giving 
the customer the ability to set their own price, firms are giving the consumer the ability 
to leave the purchase situation relatively unhurt economically. At the same time, firms 
are also expressing to the consumer that their good or service is worth the consumers 
money. Kim et al. (2010) found this to be true in their examination of a restaurant‟s 
implementation of PWYW pricing.  
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Increasing the consumer‟s perceptions of fairness is another reason firms may 
use PWYW pricing. In October of 2007, the rock band Radiohead decided to offer their 
new album, In Rainbows, as a PWYW pricing scenario. Fans logged on their band 
website and were asked to fill an empty box with how much they wanted to pay for the 
10 song album. According to Raju and Zhang (2010), “when they click on the box, a 
message appeared that said „It‟s up to you.‟ On the next page, another message appeared 
that said, „No really, it‟s up to you‟” (p. 19). The success of that promotion was 
dependent on if the band‟s fans were fair-minded (Raju & Zhang, 2010). Radiohead 
suggested that the majority of the fans were fair-minded (Raju & Zhang, 2010). 
Furthermore, in their study of a PWYW restaurant, Kim et al. (2010) found that when 
consumers feel they have a higher level of control over the price they pay, they will 
likely have higher levels of price fairness and intentions to purchase. Kim et al. (2009) 
also found fairness to be a primary influencer on the final price consumers paid, along 
with satisfaction, household income, and consumer price consciousness.  
Where Is Participatory Pricing Seen in Sport? 
 Sport organizations are constantly trying to find ways of attracting consumers, 
while maintaining customer satisfaction and value. Because it has been suggested that 
one of the only element of the marketing mix that affects revenue is price (Rao, 2009), 
many sport organizations are examining their pricing tactics to achieve these objectives. 
After an exploration of the landscape of sport pricing research, to my knowledge there is 
no literature addressing any type of participatory pricing mechanisms (i.e. NYOP & 
PWYW). However, this does not mean the industry is void of these tactics. 
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 According to Winfree and Rosentraub (2012), NYOP and PWYW mechanisms 
are rarely seen in the sport industry. However, NYOP promotions have been used in 
various sport event platforms. According to Wyshynski (2009), one of the first known 
participatory pricing mechanisms used in the sport industry in the United States occurred 
in 2009. The National Hockey League‟s (NHL) St. Louis Blues offered a name your 
own price night to their fans. They offered this promotion in only a few seating areas, 
but included any type of ticket package (including individual game tickets). A similar 
NYOP mechanism was used by another NHL team; the Florida Panthers. In this 
scenario, fans were asked to submit a bid for selected seating areas.  
 Many sport organizations that are using discounted pricing mechanisms are not 
just thinking about the revenue from the ticket itself, but also the revenue from other 
activities at a sporting event (Leeds & Von Allmen, 2011; Rascher et al, 2007). Rovell 
(2010) suggested that participatory pricing “gets teams thinking about what the 
minimum price they‟d be willing to accept to all the other ancillary revenue – parking, 
concessions, and merchandise – that they are normally leaving on the table” (p. 1). 
Michael Yorkman, president of the Florida Panthers during the NYOP promotion, 
suggested that sport is a great place to implement NYOP. He claimed that because the 
sport team‟s good or service is not the same every year, using NYOP does not devalue 
the ticket. 
 While there have been a couple of instances of NHL teams using NYOP 
mechanism to increase revenue, to the best of my knowledge there has only been one 
instance where a sport team has given complete control of the pricing to the consumer 
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(i.e. PWYW). The Mansfield Town Football Club (U.K.) was the first professional sport 
team to offer a PWYW ticketing plan for an individual game (Daily Mail, 2010). 
Mansfield Town was trying to fill their 7,000+ capacity stadium. Andrew Perry, 
chairman of the football club during the promotion, framed the event as an attendance 
booster. Perry told the fans, “Let‟s pack the ground for this match and roar the team on 
to victory” (Daily Mail, 2010, p. 2). This would suggest Mansfield Town was not only 
trying to increase attendance, but also increase customer loyalty and satisfaction. 
Winfree and Rosentraub (2012) suggested that this event may have also increased 
goodwill toward the club. The promotion seemed to work. Their normal attendance was 
around 3,000 fans per game. The night of the PWYW mechanism brought in a reported 
crowd of 7,261; double the average attendance rates and the highest it had been in eight 
years (F.C. Business, 2010). Even though the actual gate sales were kept private, it was 
suggested by Perry that the gate revenue was equal if not greater than the average game 
(F.C. Business, 2010). Beyond the monetary benefits of the event, Perry suggested that 
fans were contacting the club to express feelings of gratitude and satisfaction (F.C. 
Business, 2010).  
What Are Some Benefits of Participatory Pricing Strategies? 
Name-Your-Own-Price. Many scholars have argued that participatory pricing 
strategies can be beneficial to the firm that implements them. To begin this discussion, it 
is important to start with the benefits of NYOP strategies. The first benefit of NYOP 
mechanisms is the firm‟s ability to influence consumer perceptions and behaviors. 
According to Chandran and Morwitz (2005), consumers that participate in the price 
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setting process feel they have more control over the final price they pay, which in turn 
leads to higher intent to purchase the good or service. They argued that this increased 
intent to purchase may be due to the nature or participatory pricing. Kim et al. (2010), 
found that in addition to perceived control influencing intent to purchase, consumers 
perceive the final price with higher levels of fairness when participatory pricing is used. 
Finally, consumers that use participatory pricing have higher levels of satisfaction with 
the purchase process (Hinz et al., 2011). 
A second benefit to a firm using NYOP strategies is the firm‟s ability to collect 
information about the consumer. This information can include: demand, consumer 
behavior, and willingness-to-pay (Cai et al., 2009; Hinz et al., 2011; Spann, Skiera, & 
Schafers, 2004). Through collecting consumer information, firms are able to determine 
the demand for certain goods or services at any given time period (Cai et al., 2009). For 
example, firms are able to tell if price sensitive consumers require discounts on certain 
product attributes (i.e. day of the week, time of day, etc.). In addition to demand, firms 
can use information about bidding behavior to better understand consumer behavior 
(Hinz et al., 2011). This can include consumer perceptions of promotional pricing, 
online purchasing experiences, and couponing techniques (Hinz et al., 2011). Through 
collecting data about consumers, firms are also able to determine true willingness-to-pay 
(Hinz et al., 2011).  
Finally, another benefit of NYOP strategies includes the firm‟s ability to fulfill 
the disposal of excess supply, and to make changes in supply as a reflection of demand; 
a result of the bidding behavior of consumers (Chernev, 2003; Spann et al., 2010; Wang 
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et al., 2009). In other words, firms that use NYOP strategies can sell low demanded 
goods and services at a discount, disposing of supply that is simultaneously produced 
and consumed (i.e. sport event tickets). Therefore, NYOP firms can still receive 
unrealized revenue by giving the consumer the ability to price a good or service, but still 
having the ability to reject prices below their marginal costs (Wang et al., 2009). In 
addition, firms can then make future decisions about supply based on the previous 
demand for similar goods and services at comparable times of consumption. According 
to Chernev (2003), “this flexibility is one of the reasons why the „name your price‟ 
strategy would be considered superior to the (traditional) selection strategy” (p. 52). 
 Pay-What-You-Want. There are many different benefits of PWYW pricing 
promotions. First, even though many firms are averse to adopting PWYW pricing 
because of perceived risks (i.e. consumers paying nothing for the good or service), many 
firms that have adopted PWYW pricing have been profitable in the short and long run 
(Kim et al., 2009; Kim et al., 2010; Raju & Zhang, 2010). For example, Kim et al. 
(2009) conducted three separate studies of PWYW pricing implementation. Their sample 
consisted of a restaurant, multiplex theater, and a delicatessen. They found that in all 
three scenarios consumers “provided with a reference price paid 104% of the regular 
prices to the seller” (Kim et al., 2009, p. 53). These findings suggest that when 
consumers are given a retail value, they are likely to pay a reasonable price, sometimes 
even higher than the normal price.  
 Another concern is that firms offering a PWYW pricing scenario will have a lot 
of consumers paying nothing to the firm. Kim et al. (2009) found that consumers in each 
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of the three studies paid significantly greater than zero, including “only a few customers 
paying very low prices and that none decided to pay zero in the three studies” (p. 51). 
However, Raju and Zhang (2010) suggested that 60% of the people who downloaded 
Radiohead‟s album did not pay anything. While the average price per album was only 
$2.26, the band claims they made more on the PWYW promotion than if they sold it at 
the normal fixed-price (Raju & Zhang, 2010). It is important to keep in mind that the 
Radiohead scenario was an online transaction in which the consumer did not have to tell 
a person face-to-face their price. Therefore, while it is a potential risk for the firm, 
consumers rarely pay nothing or very little for the good or service they receive in a 
PWYW scenario that is face-to-face (Kim et al, 2010). 
 A second potential benefit from using PWYW pricing is to increase the number 
of customers purchasing the firm‟s good or service. For example, in Kim et al.‟s (2010) 
study of PWYW pricing in restaurants found that “approximately 70% of new customers 
stated they would most likely visit the restaurant again” (Kim et al., 2010). In addition, 
they found that the average price increased over time, as well as the number of 
customers. They suggested the sales increase “was mainly driven by new customers: 
compared to a daily average of approximately 11 new customers at fixed-prices, the 
number of new customers rose to approximately 17 per day” (Kim et al., 2010, p. 4).  
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Therefore, if the firm is looking to increase brand awareness, PWYW pricing could be a 
viable option. 
 A third potential benefit for PWYW pricing implementation would be to increase 
buyer consumption. In the sport context, Mansfield Town Football Club used PWYW 
pricing in attempt to increase their attendance (Daily Mail, 2010). The average 
attendance at Mill Field, home of Mansfield Town, was beginning to drop below 3,000 
fans per game, approximately 41% of the capacity. On the day of the PWYW pricing 
implementation, Mansfield Town reported 7,261 fans attended the match (F.C. Business, 
2010). Unfortunately, no follow up information was provided by the club regarding the 
effect the PWYW strategy had on long-term attendance (F.C. Business, 2010). However, 
the club did receive a lot of positive feedback from the fans participating in the 
promotion. Furthermore, Kim et al. (2010) examined the effect PWYW pricing has on 
long-term consumption. They found that consumers paid more over time when a PWYW 
pricing strategy was used, and patronage increased over time. Therefore, increasing 
consumption over time may be a benefit of PWYW pricing. An overview of the 
participatory pricing literature pertaining to its purpose is displayed in Table 2.2. 
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Table 2.2:  
Overview of participatory pricing literature - purpose 
 
Authors Central Thesis Key Findings/Summary 
Anderson & Wilson 
(2011) 
Modeling NYOP 
mechanisms 
- Opaqueness in NYOP mechanisms 
gives consumers no knowledge of the 
brand or other product information. 
Hinz, Hann, & Spann 
(2011) 
Dynamic pricing in 
NYOP markets 
- NYOP leads to higher levels of 
satisfaction. 
- NYOP can help firms understand 
consumers better. 
Kim, Natter, & Spann 
(2009) 
Buyers‟ pricing 
behavior in PWYW 
- PWYW consumers paid 104% of 
fixed-prices. 
- All PWYW consumers paid more than 
$0. 
- PWYW consumers paid what they 
deemed fair. 
Kim, Natter, & Spann 
(2010) 
PWYW Success - PWYW is effective in service 
industries with excess inventory and 
low marginal costs. 
- Sales increased by 61% with PWYW. 
- Prices paid were significantly lower 
than regular prices. 
- New customers increase was 
substantial after PWYW. 
- 87% of consumers preferred PWYW 
over fixed-price. 
- Direct contact (i.e. offering the 
PWYW price to a person face-to-face) 
increased success of PWYW. 
Mills & Law (2001) Overview of 
Priceline‟s NYOP 
- Website is accessible and user 
friendly. 
- Flexibility is the primary disadvantage 
of NYOP. 
 
 
Much of the literature investigating NYOP and PWYW pricing reveals that these 
mechanisms lead to positive consumer perceptions and behavior by giving consumers 
more control (Chandran & Morwitz; 2005), increasing repeat purchases (Kim et al., 
2009; Kim et al., 2010), and increasing their willingness-to-pay (Kim et al., 2009; Kim 
et al., 2010; Spann & Tellis, 2006) . Based on these finding, it is proposed that the final 
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prices paid by consumers encountering the NYOP and PWYW treatment will differ from 
the control group.   
Hypothesis 5: Final price paid will be significantly different between 
experimental groups. 
Form 
The Name-Your-Own-Price Process 
 As a result of the internet‟s influence on purchase decisions The traditional 
method of pricing goods or services has changed over the past two decades. Now 
consumers can go online to find out more information about a good or service, including 
price. For example, a price sensitive consumer can now go online and look at the price 
on various websites offering the desired good or service. Many industries (e.g. hotel, 
airline, rental car, and software retailers) have started to use participatory pricing 
strategies, such as NYOP. However, these online retailers (i.e. Priceline.com and 
ScoreBig.com) are not only offering a participatory pricing option to consumers. For 
those consumers that wish to have more freedom in their purchases (i.e. flight time, 
connections, choice of brand), the online retailer offers posted prices for the various 
sellers of the good or service (Anderson, 2009). For those consumers looking for the best 
deal (i.e. price sensitive consumers), the online retailer offers them the opportunity to bid 
for goods or services, without knowing details about the good or service they receive 
(Anderson, 2009). Many researchers have referred to this second method as reverse 
pricing (Cai et al., 2009; Chernev, 2003; Spann et al., 2010; Terwiesch et al., 2005).  
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 The reason this participatory pricing mechanism (i.e. NYOP) is termed reverse 
pricing is because the process of purchase is reversed from the traditional method (Spann 
et al., 2010). In a traditional fixed-price scenario, the seller determines the price of a 
good or service using one, or a combination, of several techniques (i.e. break-even 
analysis, cost-plus a profit, markups, capitation pricing, promotions, bundling, target 
return, variable [ticket] pricing, etc.). Regardless of the technique, the seller first 
determines the price of the good or service and then offers the customer the good or 
service at the predetermined price. At that point the consumer has only two options; 
purchase or not purchase. In a reversed pricing scenario the consumer has the choice 
from the beginning. In this situation, the consumer offers a price (a bid) to the seller‟s 
retailer. Once the bid is evaluated by the seller (with the seller‟s marginal costs in mind), 
the bid is either accepted or rejected (Spann et al., 2010).  
The retailer that is most well-known for their use of NYOP is Priceline. Priceline 
is essentially a business-to-consumer (B2C) retailer or broker. EBay has also joined the 
reverse pricing design. EBay offers what they term “Best Offer,” which gives customers 
the chance to submit an offer that, if accepted, binds them to that price (Hinz et al., 
2011). If the individual seller decides to reject the offer, the buyer can then bid again. 
This is an example of eBay being a consumer-to-consumer (C2C) retailer. 
Germanwings.com (a low cost airfare provider in Europe) and Ashampoo.com 
(software) are two examples of other companies that use NYOP strategies in a B2C 
market (Bernhardt & Spann, 2010; Hinz et al., 2011; Hinz & Spann, 2010). These two 
examples are unique NYOP sellers, in that; they are selling the goods and services they 
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manufacture. Unlike Priceline (a B2C retailer), who sells the services of other 
manufacturers (i.e. hotels, airlines, and rental cars), these companies do not deal with a 
retailer, and therefore, receive information about their customers and their preferences. 
Therefore, the design to this study is similar to that of Germanwings.com and 
Ashampoo.com; and creates an experiment in which sport organizations use reverse 
pricing (i.e. NYOP) to sell their own event tickets, without the use of a retailer.   
 The next few sections explain the bidding process of a reverse pricing scenario. 
As a preview, in a NYOP market, the customer is interested in purchasing a service (i.e. 
hotel room) and places an initial offer to the retailer (i.e. Priceline; Hinz et al., 2011). 
The customer is bidding for a service, not a service provider (Anderson, 2009). The 
retailer then takes the bid, and through various rounds, compares the bid price with a 
secret threshold (reserve) price set by various sellers of the service (i.e. hotels with the 
appropriate quality star rating and location; Hinz, et al., 2009; Hinz & Spann, 2008). If 
the bid is above the secret threshold price, the offer is accepted, and the customer‟s 
credit card is charged for the bid amount, plus applicable taxes (Hinz, et al., 2009; Hinz 
& Spann, 2008). If the bid is below the secret threshold price, the customer is informed 
of the rejected bid and the buyer can update their offer (Hinz, et al., 2011). However, in 
order for the customer to be able to bid immediately after the initial bid was rejected, 
they must change certain characteristics of the bid (i.e. change the quality star of the 
hotel, dates of the trip, etc.; Hinz, et al., 2009; Hinz & Spann, 2008). In summary, the 
NYOP retailer facilitates the customer‟s bids and accepts or rejects the bid according to 
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the secret threshold price of the seller (Hinz, et al., 2009; Hinz & Spann, 2008; Wang et 
al., 2009). 
The Bidding Process: The Bid. The bidding process begins with the customer 
having a need or want to purchase a good or service. When the customer begins to select 
a bid for the good or service, their objective is to choose a sequence of bids to maximize 
their utility (Fay & Laran, 2009). This can be best explained by applying prospect 
theory.  
 Derived from expected utility theory, prospect theory was developed by 
Kahneman and Tversky (1979). Kahneman and Tversky felt that expected utility theory 
was not sufficient in describing consumer judgments, citing the theory had issues with 
reliability and validity. Their primary revision to expected utility was their addition of a 
mediator: risk (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). In short, prospect theory suggests that 
individuals make decisions based on “subjective evaluations which the world of specific 
presuppostions would regard as irrational” (Tarnanidis et al., 2010, p. 271). 
 Prospect theory uses a value function to describe how individuals make 
decisions. When an individual is faced with a decision, they compare options based on 
perceptions of losses and gains from the outcome of the choices at hand. For example, if 
the individual perceives the outcome of hypothetical choice A as a gain, and the outcome 
of hypothetical choice B as a loss, they will chose option A because the outcome has a 
higher value to the individual (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). In other words, consumers 
attempt to make choices that maximize their value (utility). This is no different in the bid 
setting of a NYOP scenario. Therefore, losses weigh more than gains in decisions. 
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In addition to maximizing their utility, the customer must set the bid high enough 
to be accepted, without overpaying (Fay & Laran, 2009). This is a unique bidding 
situation, in that the bidder must keep in mind that if their bid it too low it could be 
rejected, causing them to wait until a later time to bid again. According to Fay and Laran 
(2004), “because consumers are impatient, a later win is less valuable than an earlier 
win” (p. 1786). Therefore, consumers may bid higher in an attempt to have it accepted, 
losing the larger discount. This consumer impatience and need for a valuable win has 
been referred to as a “dynamic element” of the bidding process (Fay & Laran, 2009, p. 
1786). 
The bid amount is also affected by the flexibility the bidder was in the purchase. 
For example, in a Priceline bidding scenario, if a consumer is bidding on an airplane 
ticket from Dallas/Fort Worth, Texas (DFW) to Orlando, Florida (MCO), they are not 
selecting the departure time or airline. In addition, changing certain characteristics to the 
flight may help their chances of submitting a successful bid (Spann et al., 2004). For 
example, the bidder wanting to fly from DFW to MCO might increase their chances by 
selecting more stopovers, or being flexible in their departure and arrival airport. In a 
sport event ticketing context, the consumer might be flexible in their seating section. 
After a bid is submitted to the third-party retailer, the retailer takes a few minutes 
to tell the bidder if their initial bid was accepted or rejected. If the bid is accepted, the 
credit card the bidder provided during the bidding process is charged for the amount bid. 
If the bid was rejected the consumer must wait 24 hours to bid on the exact same flight 
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(Bernhardt & Spann, 2010; Spann & Tellis, 2006). Detailed information about how the 
bids are accepted or rejected will be described henceforth. 
The Bidding Process: Accepting the Bid. According to Amaldoss and Jain 
(2008), NYOP retailers receive the rights to sell perishable goods or services, but 
without posting a price. These goods or services are those in low demand. For example, 
if a hotel realizes they have 30 unsold rooms for a given night, they may give Priceline 
the right to sell 15 of those rooms through their NYOP system. The hotel realizes that if 
these rooms are not sold, they are losing the opportunity to receive revenue from price 
sensitive customers. However, the hotel also realizes that if they do not set a minimum 
price to cover their marginal costs, they will not profit from the transaction (Wang et al., 
2009). Therefore, the hotel tells Priceline their lowest acceptable price; their secret 
threshold price.  
 It would be simple to say that the hotel would just set their secret threshold price 
at the cost it would take to fill that room (marginal costs). However, that price threshold 
setting method may not be the best profit maximizing method. Terwiesch et al. (2005) 
suggested that a seller should set their threshold price “to maximize the cumulative profit 
from all successful offers” (p. 346). In other words, the hotel or airline may be able to 
increase the threshold price beyond the marginal cost because of the demand for those 
services. For example, if an airline realizes that the demand for airfare into a city has 
historically increased around a certain time of year (i.e. city festival, national conference, 
etc.), they may increase that threshold price because they know the historical contexts of 
the demand around that time period. Likewise, hotels in a heavy tourism district of a city 
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might increase their threshold price on the weekends because traveler‟s have an 
increased need for weekend accommodations. This demand based price setting is 
comparable to variable ticket pricing mechanisms used in the sport industry (Rascher et 
al., 2007). 
  The threshold price commonly used in NYOP formats has been called a reserve 
price (Cai et al., 2009). If the customer‟s bid is above that reserve price, then the reverse 
pricing transaction is complete (Cai et al., 2009). Therefore, for a successful NYOP 
transaction to occur, the customer must make educated bids. According to Kanna and 
Kopalle (2001), if customers make conservative bids because they are uncertain about 
the bid price, the likelihood of a failed bid increases. They believe this is what happened 
when Priceline first began. “Priceline‟s early experience indicated that the bid success 
rate was only around 10 percent, and only 35 percent of the bids tended to be 
nonfrivolous” (Kanna & Kopalle, 2001, p. 75). 
 In light of their unsuccessful bidders, Priceline attempted to increase the bidder‟s 
chance of submitting an acceptable bid through educating the bidder. According to 
Wilson and Zhang (2008), when a consumer submitted a frivolous bid, Priceline stepped 
in and suggested the customer‟s bid has a low probability of being accepted. They stated, 
“In a very loose way, Priceline is indicating a bid of $49 has a high probability of 
success while a bid of $47 has a lower probability of success. At this state – before the 
bid is processed – the customer is asked to consider revising the bid” (Wilson & Zhang, 
2008, p. 282). 
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 After the service provider has submitted a secret threshold price to the NYOP 
retailer, and the customer has been informed if their bid is unlikely to be accepted, the 
NYOP retailer goes through a set of comparisons. According to Anderson and Wilson 
(2011), the NYOP retailer takes the customers bid and creates a list of all the services 
that match the request. For example, a customer bids on a flight from DFW to MCO 
with no more than one stopover. The NYOP retailer then finds all the flights (i.e. 
airlines) that fly from DFW to MCO for the travel date that have less than two stopovers. 
To keep the selection process fair, giving all properties on the new list an equal 
likelihood of being selected, the NYOP retailer will randomly select a qualifying service 
provider (Anderson & Wilson, 2011). The NYOP retailer then takes the bid and 
compares it with the secret threshold price of the random service provider. “If the 
selected property has a price lower than the consumer‟s bid then a transaction occurs” 
(Anderson & Wilson, 2011, p. 33). If the customer‟s bid is not above the secret threshold 
price, a second round occurs (Anderson & Wilson, 2011). 
 In the second round of the NYOP retailer‟s system, the original list is examined. 
Those service providers that qualify for the bidder‟s needs are then selected based on 
different criteria than the first round. “In this second round each property does not have 
an equal chance of being selected” (Anderson & Wilson, 2011, p. 33). Here, the NYOP 
retailer looks at the historical success rates of the remaining service provider‟s first 
round. In other words, if a service provider historically accepted numerous bids in the 
first round, their likelihood of being selected in the second round increases substantially 
(Anderson & Wilson, 2011).  
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 If after the second round of comparisons, the bid price is still not accepted by a 
service provider (i.e. the customer‟s bid is below the threshold price of all service 
providers in the two rounds), the round continues. In other words, the second round 
continues until either the bid is accepted by a service provider, or there are no more 
service providers left that meet the qualifications of the bid (Anderson & Wilson, 2011). 
If the bid is not above any service provider‟s secret threshold price, the retailer notifies 
the customer that their bid has not been accepted, and they must wait to bid on the 
identical good or service.  
The Bidding Process: Rejecting the Bid. In the event that the bid is not accepted 
through the various rounds of bid-secret threshold price comparisons, the customer is 
informed of the unsuccessful bid. According to Spann and Tellis (2006), this is the point 
in the NYOP situation where processes change. They suggest that there are two different 
types of NYOP rejection scenarios: a) the retailer limits the customer to a single bid over 
a 24 hour period (i.e. Priceline‟s model; Bernhardt & Spann, 2010; Spann & Tellis, 
2006), or b) the retailer lets the customer bid again. Fay (2004) suggests that even if the 
retailer limits that customer to a single bid, they may still use multiple credit cards to 
immediately bid again. Therefore, some suggest that imposing a single bid is implausible 
(Bernhardt & Spann, 2010). Discussions about allowing multiple bids will be examined 
later. 
 If a bid is rejected, information may be obtained by the retailer. This information 
includes the “lower limit of the range of (the customer‟s) price at that moment” (Spann 
& Tellis, 2006, p.66). However, in the current scenario, the retailer does not share this 
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information with either exchange party. If a firm were to sell its own goods and services 
through a NYOP mechanism, they would have the advantage of knowing the consumer‟s 
reservation price. Spann et al. (2010) suggest that there a couple of drawbacks to a firm 
selling their own goods or services through NYOP mechanisms. They state, “For 
example, if Priceline does not sell a given seat on a flight to a customer interested in 
buying it right now, both the seat and the customer may disappear before another 
opportunity for a trade arises” (Spann et al., 2010, p. 1058-1059). Likewise, Amaldoss 
and Jain (2008) suggest if the customer‟s bid is rejected, they may still have the chance 
to sell the good or service to another customer. Therefore, by selling a good or service 
through a NYOP mechanism, an individual sport organization may be able to know the 
customer‟s lower reservation price, even if rejected.  
Revenue from Name-Your-Own-Price Mechanisms. If the bid is accepted by a 
service provider through one of the rounds in Priceline‟s system, then the customer is 
charged for that amount. However, Priceline makes their profit from the differences 
between the bid and the secret threshold price (Amaldoss & Jain, 2008; Anderson & 
Wilson, 2011; Kanna & Kopella, 2001). Priceline‟s profit model is different for each 
type of good or service they sold. For example, in the airline and hotel industry, they 
receive the difference between the bid and the threshold price. When they sold groceries 
and gasoline through a NYOP mechanism the retailers (grocery store & gas stations) 
received full retail price, Priceline received the difference (Kanna & Kopalle, 2001). 
According to Kanna and Kopalle (2001), selling groceries and gasoline did not work 
because “consumers (mostly deal seeking consumers) were very knowledgeable about 
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prices and consistently bid low to get good deals, and as a result the margins were 
mostly negative” (p. 76). 
To illustrate the current method retailers like Priceline use to profit from NYOP, 
take an example of a customer wishing to stay at a four star hotel in downtown Fort 
Worth, Texas. The customer submits a bid for $75 per night. The bid is accepted by a 
qualifying hotel with a secret threshold price of $50. The customer still pays the $75 bid 
price (plus taxes), and the hotel receives the $50 asking price. However, Priceline 
receives the $25 difference. Interestingly, the customer never knows the secret threshold 
price, and the hotel never knows the customer‟s bid. According to Amaldoss and Jain 
(2008), the retailer (Priceline) is the only entity in the exchange that knows both the bid 
amount and the secret threshold price. Therefore, if the retailer was taken out of the 
equation (meaning the service provider hosts the reverse pricing scenario), the service 
provider receives the full profit while keeping their secret threshold price a secret. In 
addition, the service provider can then gain direct access to the individual bids for their 
goods or services. This information can help organizations make decisions about 
demand and setting optimal prices. 
The Name-Your-Own-Price Process in Sport. The NYOP promotion at the St. 
Louis Blues was for an individual game, full-season ticket, and smaller ticket packages. 
The promotion was also sponsored by Ticketmaster. Wyshynski (2009) stated the 
process began with “a pulldown menu with minimum bids for different tickets. To bid 
for them, you type a full dollar amount” (p. 1). The St. Louis Blues accepted or rejected 
the fan‟s offer. The Ticketmaster sponsorship worked well for the Blues, because if the 
  
48 
 
consumer bid below the retail value of that ticket, Ticketmaster picked up the difference. 
This is a variation to the third-party retailer (i.e. Priceline) commonly seen in NYOP 
mechanisms. However, the Florida Panthers‟ NYOP promotion was somewhat different 
from the Blues‟. In their promotion if the bid was rejected, the Panthers submitted a 
counter offer to the bidder (Wyshynski, 2010), thus turning the NYOP mechanism into a 
negotiation. Regardless, in these sport NYOP contexts, there was no secret threshold 
price set and given to a third party. Here the organization knew the secret threshold price 
as well as each individual bid.  
 In the airline industry, airlines do not need to worry about varying ticket prices 
because consumers are coming into the purchase situation understanding they may not 
pay the same price as the person sitting next to them. However, Rovell (2010) suggests 
that teams should be concerned with using participatory pricing mechanisms because 
regular season ticket holders have already purchased the tickets at retail price. 
Wyshynski (2010) suggested that the biggest difference between the Panthers‟ 
promotion and the Blues‟ promotion is the Blues‟ gave season ticket holders assurances 
of the value of their full priced tickets. For example, “season ticket holders that might 
have their feelings hurt by these deep discounts were assured that the plan was limited to 
500 seats and four sections in the arena that were already rather unsold” (p. 1). Also, in 
this scenario the fan was shown the retail values of the tickets during the bidding 
process. Regardless of who used the NYOP promotion, both sport organizations have 
responded to the bids within a 24 hours period.  
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The Pay-What-You-Want Mechanism. The PWYW pricing process is relatively 
simple. The PWYW pricing mechanism gives the consumer ultimate freedom in the final 
price they pay. According to Kim et al. (2009), “PWYW is a participative pricing model 
in which…the buyer can set any price above or equal to zero, and the seller cannot reject 
it” (p. 44). Therefore, the most important difference between PWYW pricing and NYOP 
is that the firm cannot reject the buyer‟s offer. Thus, there is no secret threshold price in 
PWYW pricing; the firm must take any offer (Kim et al., 2009). Some have argued that 
this method is a “marketer‟s dream” (Raju & Zhang, 2010, p. 22), meaning each buyer 
will leave the scenario knowing they did not overpay.  
 Kim et al. (2010) find that there are several design structures that should be 
considered when using a PWYW pricing strategy. They suggest that the method of 
payment can influence the prices paid. For example, those firms that use a face-to-face 
(direct) payment method must tell an actual person representing that firm what they want  
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to pay. In this scenario, if the consumer pays nothing (which is possible in PWYW), 
their actions may be seen as a violation of “social exchange norms… resulting in distress 
and social disapproval by other people” (Kim et al., 2009, p. 46). If the method of 
payment was online, the consumer may feel disguised, and therefore less distress after 
little or no payment.  
Finally, giving the consumer other information about the good or service (e.g. the 
retail value) may give consumers a reference in which to form their offer. This may help 
consumers that do not know much about the good or service. In addition, by offering a 
reference price, the firm gives the customers a norm in which to adjust their behavior. 
For example, according to Raju and Zhang (2010), “many of the 5 million visitors a year 
to the Metropolitan Museum of Art in New York pay $20 a person to enter, despite the 
sign that clearly specifies that the price is a „suggested donation‟” (p. 25). An overview 
of the participatory pricing literature pertaining to its form is displayed in Table 2.3. 
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Table 2.3:  
Overview of participatory pricing literature - form 
 
Authors Central Thesis Key Findings/Summary 
Amaldoss & Jain 
(2008) 
Joint bids for multiple 
items in NYOP 
- Joint bidding can increase NYOP 
profits and consumer surplus in some 
conditions. 
Cai, Chao, & Li (2009) Multiple bidding in 
NYOP 
- Double bidding outperforms single 
bidding, especially when inventory is 
low. 
Chandran & Morwitz 
(2005) 
Consumer perceptions 
and behavior in 
participative pricing 
- Consumer focus of setting the price of 
the bid, rather than whether the bid 
was a good deal. 
- Focusing on the price, rather than a 
good deal, leads to higher intent to 
purchase. 
Ding, Eliashberg, 
Huber, & Saini (2005) 
Bidder‟s Emotions - Emotions effect the bidder‟s mindset 
and behavior. 
- Excitement and frustration are the two 
primary emotions associated with 
bidding. 
Fay & Laran (2009) Bid behavior in 
NYOP 
- Bids will eventually decrease over 
time.  
- Impatient and impatient bidders 
decrease at the same rate. 
Kanna & Kopalle 
(2001) 
Dynamic and reverse 
pricing. 
- The reverse pricing process. 
- Reference prices and consumer price 
knowledge determines retailer profit 
margin. 
Spann & Tellis (2006) Consumer decisions in 
NYOP 
- Many consumers are not rational in 
their decision making. 
- Firms can segment consumers by 
bidding behavior. 
Terwiesch, Savin, & 
Hann (2005) 
NYOP bidding 
behavior and haggling 
- NYOP sellers should set secret 
threshold prices to maximize profit 
(i.e. beyond marginal costs). 
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What Are Some Negative Outcomes of Participatory Pricing Strategies? 
Name-Your-Own-Price  
While there are many reasons why firms may choose participatory pricing 
strategies, there are several issues that might arise with their implementation. Regardless 
of their implementation, sport organizations that seek to use participatory pricing 
strategies should be aware of these disadvantages and take steps to overcome their 
pitfalls. Therefore, the following issues should be considered when implementing 
participatory pricing strategies. 
 First, a potential negative outcome to implementing participatory pricing is that 
most of the time, the NYOP mechanism is only used by third-party retailers (i.e. 
ScoreBig & Priceline). In NYOP, consumers bid on an opaque service (e.g. hotel room, 
airline ticket, rental car). These bids go to a third-party retailer (i.e. Priceline) that offers 
supplier‟s (e.g. hotels, airlines, and rental car companies) services. If the customer‟s bid 
is accepted by the third-party retailer, the retailer retains the bid price minus the seller‟s 
price, and the supplier received reduced revenue (Wang et al., 2009). 
 Unique to the reverse pricing mechanism (i.e. NYOP), customers are bidding 
against the merchant, not one another (Chernev, 2003). In other types of auctions, 
customers seek to purchase a good or service by competing with other customers. This is 
an advantage to sellers because consumers are bidding against each other on their good 
or service. This gives the seller the potential to receive greater profits than if the 
traditional fixed-price method was used. Therefore, in reverse pricing (i.e. NYOP) 
consumers are only bidding/negotiating with the seller; the potential to provoke a 
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“bidding war” between customers is no longer an option. In addition, customers always 
have the option to walk away from a transaction if the bid is not accepted in a NYOP 
situation (Chernev, 2003). 
 Another disadvantage to using a third party in NYOP strategies is the inability to 
gather consumer information, specifically demand for the goods or services. According 
to Amaldoss and Jain (2008), the retailer is the only entity that knows both the bid 
amount and the secret threshold price. Therefore, eliminating the third-party retailer 
could give the service provider the opportunity to know each bid for their goods or 
services, while still keeping the secret threshold price from the individual customers. 
 The final drawback to the NYOP mechanism is that customers are bidding on 
opaque goods or services (Amaldoss & Jain, 2008). This is a potential problem when 
providing service quality to consumers. Therefore, consumers must be flexible in their 
purchases (Mills & Law, 2001), possibly causing negative consumer perceptions.  
Pay-What-You-Want 
Probably the biggest drawback to using PWYW pricing is the potential risk 
associated with non-payment. Even though much of the research in participatory pricing 
has found that purchase intentions increase when such methods are used, firms are still 
hesitant to use PWYW pricing (Kim et al., 2009). Much of this hesitation may be formed 
by the inability of intentions to be an indicator of behavior. However, in the extant 
PWYW pricing literature, each study has found that consumers pay appropriate and 
reasonable prices, in relation to the average retail price (Kim et al., 2009; Kim et al., 
2010). Further evidence of increased profits using PWYW pricing can be seen in the 
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restaurant industry. For example, the One World Café, a restaurant in Salt Lake City, 
Utah, uses a PWYW pricing strategy. Here the consumer eats their food and then tells 
the owner or manager what they feel the food was worth. Since 2005, the café has 
realized a 5% profit margin, within the acceptable 4%-6% range found in other small 
restaurants (Raju & Zhang, 2010). This behavior is considered a display of altruism and 
fairness on the part of the consumer (Kim et al., 2010).  
Another possible drawback to using PWYW pricing is the focus consumers place 
on price. Some have argued that PWYW pricing may negatively affect the perceived 
value of the good or service being sold (Raju & Zhang, 2010). Focusing primarily on the 
price of the good may take the consumer‟s attention away from the experience of the 
sport event, and lead them to continually evaluate whether the experience is worth what 
they paid. This can be harmful to the brand‟s value if a consumer‟s experience is subpar. 
Thus, a negative event experience could lead to a decrease in the price paid in a PWYW 
scenario, as well as the fairness of fixed-prices (ratio of inputs to outputs, equity theory). 
Perceived Value 
Defined 
Perceived value has been investigated in many disciplines. Extant literature has 
sought to discover more about consumers and their perceptions and behaviors. For 
example, much of the seminal work related to perceived value has come from consumer 
behavior and marketing (e.g. Helkkula & Kelleher, 2010; Parasuraman, 1997; 
Parasuraman & Grewal, 2000; and Zeithaml, 1988), sport marketing (e.g. Han & Kwon, 
2009; Kwon, Trail, & James, 2007), and tourism disciplines (e.g. Petrick, 2002; 2004; 
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Petrick, Backman, & Bixler, 1999). The remainder of this section of the literature review 
will discuss the findings from these multiple disciplines and their application to the 
current study. 
One of the hallmark definitions of perceived value comes from Zeithaml (1988). 
According to Zeithaml (1988), perceived value is “the customer‟s overall assessment of 
the utility of a product based on perceptions of what is received and what is given” (p. 
14). In other words, perceived value is the utility received from a transaction; the 
consumer evaluates what they received based on what they give (pay). Petrick (2002) 
suggests that perceived value consists of five variables, with the core variable being 
quality and perception of price. For example, this definition would assume that when a 
consumer decides whether they receive value from a transaction, their decision is based 
on the quality, monetary and behavioral price, reputation, and emotional response based 
on the good or service received.   
According to Zeithaml (1988), there are four perspectives that researchers can 
take when investigating value. Researchers can first investigate the relationship between 
value and low price. The second, researchers can seek to determine if value is tied to the 
good or service the consumer wants, compared to what they get. The fourth perspective 
is concerned with what the consumer receives in relation to what they give. The third 
perspective will be discussed henceforth. 
The third is possibly the most important to discuss in light of the current study. 
This perspective suggests that value is determined by evaluating the quality of the good 
or service the consumer receives in relation to the price they paid. The current study is 
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unique due to the context being investigated; sport events. In this context, every 
consumer receives the same product; the event. At a professional sporting event, the 
patrons are consuming the same product on the field (however, non-game experiences 
can change product evaluations), regardless of the price they pay. Therefore, if perceived 
value is what is being investigated, using Zeithaml‟s (1988) third perspective (value is 
the quality received versus the price paid), one of the few things marketers can control is 
the price paid. If the consumer has a more favorable perception of the price, they may be 
more likely to have a positive perceive value. Therefore, when quality is uncontrollable 
by marketers (i.e. quality of the game play, wins/losses, etc.), consumers may be more 
likely to focus on the price perception (i.e. price fairness) side of this value 
determination. Therefore, based on the aforementioned implications, the current study 
posits that perceived valued is influenced by the pricing mechanism used.    
Hypothesis 2: Perceived value evaluations will be significantly different between 
experimental groups. 
Need for Perceived Value 
Before the discussion continues to address the conceptualization and dimensions 
of perceived value, it is believed to be important to address the need for the investigation 
of this construct. Several researchers posit that perceived value is the core to many 
decisions consumers make. For example, Petrick (2004) suggested that “perceived value 
is the most important indicator of future purchase behavior for services” (p. 29). Partially 
due to these behaviors, purchase intentions and willingness-to-pay were included in the 
current study.  
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Perceived value is important to the current study for a couple of reasons. First, 
Parasuraman (1997) suggested that marketers should investigate value because it is one 
of the most effective ways to of gaining a competitive edge. Second, Dodds (1996) 
suggested that beyond the relationship between quality and price, consumers make 
decisions about their purchases based on the perceptions of others. In other words, 
consumers are aware of their peers, and they are more likely to make decisions that are 
viewed positively by others. This is important to the current study because consumers 
participating in price setting may be more likely to place a bid that is socially acceptable; 
possibly reducing the likelihood of frivolous bids. 
In his investigation of cruise line passengers‟ perceived value and repurchase 
intentions, Petrick (2004) found that “perceived value and quality were strongly related 
to repurchase intentions” (p. 37). Furthermore, Han and Kwon (2009) suggest that 
perceived value has primarily been investigated by focusing on extrinsic cues and 
perceived quality. Therefore, it is believe to be important to include quality into the 
conceptualization of perceived value. The following section will investigate the 
dimensions of perceived value used in the current study; including quality. 
Dimensions of Perceived Value 
The current study modified Petrick‟s (2004) model of perceived value.  
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Therefore, perceived value has been segmented into five distinct concepts: a) quality, b) 
emotional response, c) monetary price, d) behavioral price, and e) reputation. Perceived 
quality has been identified as a contributing factor to overall perceived value by 
researchers (e.g. Cronin, Brady, & Hult, 2000). Likewise, Petrick (2002) included 
quality in his scale. Petrick (2002) drew from Zeithaml‟s (1988) study when defining 
quality as “a consumer judgment about a product‟s or service‟s overall excellence or 
superiority” (p. 31). Petrick (2002) found that quality was an influencing variable on 
overall perceived value, however, it also had a significant impact on consumers‟ 
repurchase intentions. Emotional response focuses primarily on the pleasurable feelings 
following a purchase. Monetary price is a determination of price from the consumer‟s 
perspective. Behavioral price is the nonmonetary evaluation of a transaction. Finally, 
reputation deals with the consumer‟s perceptions of the supplier (Petrick, 2004). An 
overview of the perceived value literature examined in this chapter is displayed in Table 
2.4. 
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Table 2.4:  
Overview of perceived value literature 
Authors Central Thesis Key Findings/Summary 
Han & Kwon (2009) Mediating effect of 
perceived quality in 
relation to extrinsic 
cures and perceived 
value 
- Perceived quality partially mediates 
the relationships of brand name and 
country of origin and perceived value. 
Kwon, Trail, & James 
(2007) 
The mediating role of 
perceived value on the 
team ID and purchase 
intention relationship 
- When taking perceived value as a 
mediator, team identification 
influences consumers‟ purchase 
intentions of team-licensed apparel. 
Parasuraman (1997) Understanding how 
customer value can 
help an organization 
gain a competitive 
edge 
- Conceptualization of customer value. 
- Creates a framework for 
understanding customer value. 
Petrick (2002) Multi-Dimensional 
Scale for measuring 
perceived value 
- Created a conceptualization of 
perceived value, which includes 
quality. 
- Developed the scale of five variables 
toward perceived value (i.e. quality, 
emotional response, monetary price, 
behavioral price, and reputation). 
Petrick, Backman, & 
Bixler (1999) 
What factors impact 
golfer satisfaction and 
perceived value 
- Perceived value has an impact on 
purchase intentions, based on the 
category of course they played. 
Zeithaml (1988) How price, quality, 
and value influence 
behavior 
- Presents a conceptualization of value. 
- Develops propositions about 
managing price, quality, and value. 
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Willingness-to-Pay 
 There are numerous investigations seeking to understand the willingness-to-pay 
(WTP) construct. These studies have attempted to determine the best method of 
measurement (Donaldson, Thomas, & Torgerson, 1997; Theysohn, 2006; Voelckner, 
2006) and the relationship between bidding behavior and WTP in participatory pricing 
scenarios (Spann et al., 2004). A brief overview of these investigations is forthcoming. 
However, an understanding of the operational definition of the WTP construct is needed. 
 The WTP construct has primarily been defined and explored by marketers and 
economists. Some have referred to WTP as price tolerance; how high can the price get 
before the customer switches to another good or service (Anderson, 1996). Economists 
sometimes refer to WTP as a “reservation price” (Homburg, Koshate, & Hoyer, 2005, p. 
85; Voelckner, 2006). However, much of the extant literature suggests WTP is the 
amount of money a customer is willing to spend on a given good or service (Homburg et 
al., 2005; Voelckner, 2006). In other words, WTP indicates “the maximum amount that 
consumers intend to pay” (Chung, Kyle, Petrick, & Absher, 2011, p. 1039). 
 Much of the WTP literature and measures have been centered on one main 
theory, Contingent Valuation. This approach was developed in 1947 by Ciriacy-Wantrup 
Theysohn (2006). Theysohn (2006) suggested that the Contingent Valuation approach 
asks the customer to state their WTP during a purchase process. Theysohn (2006) also 
proposed that this “is now considered a common tool in marketing research to derive 
pricing strategies across multiple product spectrums” (p. 21).  
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 The relationship between perceived value and willingness-to-pay is relatively 
unexplored in the sport marketing literature. Much of the research surrounding perceived 
value focuses on the relationship between perceived value and (re)purchase intentions. 
In their study of quality, satisfaction, and consumer behavior, Xu et al. (2006) found that 
quality led to satisfaction, and satisfaction in turn led to positive consumer behaviors 
(e.g. word of mouth, willingness to pay more, and  patronage). In addition, according to 
Hamburg et al. (2005), a consumer is willing to pay an amount that reflects the value 
they receive from the transaction. Furthermore, Cronin et al. (2000) argued that 
perceived value may be the greatest influence on consumers when they determine their 
behavioral intentions. In addition, Zeithaml, Berry, & Parasuraman (1996) proposed that 
marketers can influence consumers‟ behavioral intentions. According to Zeithaml et al. 
(1996), consumers‟ willingness-to-pay is included in the conceptualization of behavioral 
intentions.  
Willingness-to-Pay & Participatory Pricing Strategies  
 In the extant literature, the WTP-participatory pricing relationship has been 
examined (e.g. Spann et al., 2004; Fay & Laran, 2009), as well as with sport goods and 
services offered via internet transactions (Theyson, 2006). Spann et al. (2004) argued 
that by obtaining a customer‟s WTP, firms can set optimal prices, often with price 
discrimination in mind. They also suggested that “name-your-own-price sellers (are 
able) to segment consumers based on their WTP” (Spann et al., 2004, p. 32). It has also 
been suggested that participatory pricing firms can also predict a customer‟s WTP based 
on numerous variables (e.g. demographics), and set threshold prices according to these 
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WTP evaluations (Spann et al., 2004). Theysohn (2006) posited that digital goods and 
services are often difficult to price due to their unconventional characteristics (i.e. low 
marginal costs). Many sport goods and services sold through participatory pricing 
strategies are similar to digital goods and services (e.g. low marginal costs). Therefore, 
“pricing strategies based on consumers‟ WTP are becoming more and more important 
and the knowledge of WTP is crucial for each club to evaluate the profitability of such a 
product” (Theysohn, 2006, p. 18). 
 Due to the proposed importance of “pricing strategies based on consumers‟ 
WTP” (Theysohn, 2006, p. 18), firms should recognize the benefits of focusing on WTP. 
For example, Spann et al. (2004) suggested that “comparing prices with consumers‟ 
WTP allows us to determine consumer surplus” (p. 23). This would give firms the ability 
to set optimal prices for their goods and services. This includes the threshold prices for 
future participatory pricing strategies (i.e. NYOP). This can also give firms information 
needed for making product offering and pricing decisions. For example, by 
understanding WTP, firms can determine whether they should price bundle certain 
product offerings, price discriminate, or offer a good or service through another 
marketing channel (i.e. web based; Spann et al., 2004). 
 While there is limited research examining the relationship between WTP and 
participatory pricing strategies, some have suggested this relationship should be 
examined further (Spann et al., 2004). Spann et al. (2004) found that consumers 
participating in price setting through NYOP mechanisms often bid below their WTP. In 
fact, their investigation revealed consumers bid 3.33% below their WTP (Spann et al., 
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2004). This would suggest that consumers participating in price setting often change 
their bid amount based on the mechanism used. Therefore, based on the aforementioned 
findings, the current study posits that willingness-to-pay is influenced by the pricing 
mechanism used.    
Hypothesis 3: Willingness-to-pay evaluations will be significantly different 
between experimental groups. 
An overview of the WTP literature examined in this chapter is displayed in Table 2.5. 
 
 
 
Table 2.5:  
Overview of willingness-to-pay literature 
 
Authors Central Thesis Key Findings/Summary 
Donaldson, Thomas, & 
Torgerson (1997) 
Open-ended vs. 
payment scale 
measurements of WTP 
 
- Payment scales led to more valid 
WTP measurements than open-ended 
approaches. 
- Payment scale increase response rate 
and values, as well as the association 
between WTP and the customer‟s 
ability to pay. 
Chernev (2003) Comparing WTP 
between NYOP and 
select your price 
- Selection is preferred over NYOP. 
- Using reference prices during NYOP 
generation is beneficial. 
Theysohn (2006) Sport WTP on the 
internet 
- Reviewed the WTP literature in the 
sport industry. 
Spann, Skiera, & 
Schafers (2004) 
NYOP bidding 
behavior 
- NYOP sellers can segment consumers 
based on bidding behavior (i.e WTP). 
Voelckner (2006) Measuring WTP - WTP is significantly higher when 
consumers are faced with a 
hypothetical purchase situation than 
with a real situation. 
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Purchase Intentions 
 Firms realize that if consumers do not repurchase their goods or services, they 
will not be successful (Wilkinson, 2009). Therefore, it is important to measure purchase 
intentions because it gives marketers an idea of the successfulness of their marketing 
campaigns. In the current study, it is important to measure purchase intentions because it 
is often the dependent variable of interest when using participatory pricing mechanisms. 
For example, a participatory pricing mechanism will likely be used when there is low 
demand for an event, as well as when there is surplus of inventory (tickets) to be sold. 
Therefore, this promotional pricing strategy is aimed at increasing attendance. By 
assessing purchase intentions, marketers implementing participatory pricing strategies 
can determine if the promotional strategy was successful.   
According to Tsuji et al. (2007), “measuring future intentions of attendees is 
important for the continued success of an event” (p. 201). Consumer behavior literature 
often seeks to investigate the motivations of consumers before, during, and after a 
purchase experience. One of the most commonly used theories pertaining to purchase 
intentions is the theory of planned behavior (Ajzen, 1991). The theory of planned 
behavior was developed from the theory of reasoned action. According to Ajzen (1991), 
“a central factor in the theory of planned behavior is the individual‟s intention to 
perform a given behavior” (p. 181). In other words, Ajzen (1991) suggests that people 
are more likely to behave in a way if their intentions are strong.  
Much of the research surrounding perceived value has come from the 
investigation of the relationship between perceived value and (re)purchase intentions. 
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Some of this influx of perceived value studies can be attributed to Parasuraman‟s (1997) 
suggestion that it is one of the most effective ways of gaining a competitive edge. 
Likewise, Parasuraman and Grewal (2000) suggested that this competitive edge is a 
product of a firm‟s ability to increase positive value perceptions, thus increasing the 
likelihood a consumer will have increased purchase intentions. According to Han and 
Kwon (2009), much of this research has attempted to discover the way marketers are 
able to convey value to customers.  
Several studies have been published in the sport marketing literature in the last 
couple of decades that focus on the relationship between perceived value and purchase 
intentions. Kwon et al. (2007) found that perceived value influences a consumer‟s 
purchase intention when accounting for team identification. Likewise, Petrick et al. 
(1999) found that perceived value influenced golfers‟ repurchase intentions. In addition 
to the sport marketing discipline, several other researchers have found a positive 
relationship between perceived value and purchase intentions (e.g. Cronin et al., 2000; 
Wakefield & Barnes, 1996; Zeithaml, 1988). 
Most important to the current discussion, Ajzen (1991) suggests that intentions 
are often predicted by examining several variables, including perceived behavioral 
control. For example, if a consumer feels like they have control over the purchase 
situation, they are likely to behave in a way that matches their intentions. According to 
Chandran and Morwitz (2005), consumers that participate in the price setting process 
feel they have more control over the price. Chandran and Morwitz (2005) found that 
feelings of control led to higher intent to purchase the good or service. They argue that 
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this increase in intent to purchase may be due to the nature of participatory pricing 
(Chandran & Morwitz, 2005). Furthermore, McDonald and Stavros (2007) found that 
consumers are more likely to repurchase if their contributions are being recognized by 
the firm. Based on the aforementioned findings, the current study proposes that 
participants‟ purchase intentions will be influenced by the experimental treatment they 
are randomly assigned to. 
Hypothesis 4: Purchase intention evaluations will be significantly different 
between experimental groups. 
While assessing purchase intentions is commonly done in many disciplines, there 
are issues surrounding this measure. Most importantly, measuring purchase intentions is 
not a confirmation of behavior. In other words, someone may intend to purchase a 
product in the future, however, until the purchase occurs they are still merely intentions. 
Marketers should be aware of the limitations to purchase intentions, and when available, 
rely on actual purchase data. An overview of the purchase intentions literature examined 
in this chapter is displayed in Table 2.6. 
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Table 2.6:  
Overview of purchase intentions literature 
 
Authors Central Thesis Key Findings/Summary 
Ajzen (1991) Theory of planned 
behavior 
- The intensity of people‟s intentions 
dictates their behavior. 
- When people have control over their 
behavior, intentions are formed. 
Chandran & Morwitz 
(2005) 
Consumer perceptions 
and behavior in 
participative pricing 
- When consumers participate in setting 
a price, they feel like they have more 
control. 
- More control in price setting leads to 
increased purchase intentions.  
McDonald & Stavros 
(2007) 
Consumers‟ 
contributions 
- If consumers‟ contributions are being 
recognized by the firm, they are more 
likely to repurchase the good or 
service. 
 
 
 
Summary 
 This chapter examined and reviewed the theoretical underpinnings of various 
elements within the pricing and marketing literature. Specifically, the purpose and form 
of participatory pricing strategies currently being used in the business and leisure 
industries was examined, and potential application of participatory pricing strategies in 
the sport industry was surveyed. In addition, the effect pricing strategies can have on 
perceived value, willingness-to-pay, and purchase intentions was investigated.  
 Throughout chapter II, five separate hypotheses were proposed. A summary of 
all hypotheses is shown in Table 7, as well as the method of testing for each hypothesis. 
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Table 2.7:  
Summary of hypotheses  
 
Hypothesis Summary 
Statistical 
Analysis 
1 
Price fairness evaluations will be significantly different 
between experimental groups. 
MANOVA 
2 
Perceived value evaluations will be significantly different 
between experimental groups. 
MANOVA 
3 
Willingness-to-pay evaluations will be significantly 
different between experimental groups. 
MANOVA 
4 
Purchase intention evaluations will be significantly 
different between experimental groups. 
MANOVA 
5 
Final price paid will be significantly different between 
experimental groups. 
ANOVA 
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CHAPTER III 
METHODOLOGY 
The purpose of this study is to better understand the effects participatory pricing 
strategies have on consumer perceptions and behaviors in a sport event pricing scenario. 
In Chapter II, five testable hypotheses were proposed. These hypotheses were developed 
based on previous literature and theory pertaining to participatory pricing mechanisms, 
price perceptions, and consumer behavior. This chapter discusses the various 
methodological procedures needed to test these hypotheses. The chapter begins with an 
explanation of the research strategy. The rest of this chapter explains how a  true 
experimental design is used to evaluate consumer‟s perceptions of participatory pricing 
mechanisms.  
Following a discussion regarding the research strategy, a description of the 
methodological approach used, and why it is being implemented is discussed. Second, a 
review of the research design is presented. This section includes information about the 
experimental justification. Third, the research setting is presented. Fourth, the design of 
the pricing mechanisms and procedure is presented. Fifth, a description of how the 
measures were developed is presented. Finally, the statistical analyses used to test each 
hypothesis are presented. 
Research Strategy 
 This study tested five separate and distinct hypotheses using a convenience 
sample. The posttest-only control group design experiment was an experiment used to 
determine the difference between three pricing mechanisms: a) NYOP, b) PWYW, and 
  
70 
 
c) traditional fixed-price (control group).  
Research Design 
 This section focuses on the overall design of the current experiment and begins 
with a discussion regarding why an experimental design was chosen instead of other 
methodological approaches. Next, an explanation is presented as to why the current 
experiment is a true experiment rather than pre-experimental or a true experiment. Third, 
the specific experimental design being used is presented. Following the experimental 
design explanation, the various threats to internal and external validity that should be 
controlled for in the design is described.  
Why Experimental Design? 
 While there are many different ways to conduct quantitative research, one of the 
most commonly used methods in consumer behavior is experimental design. According 
to Field and Hole (2003), there are two types of research: a) experimental and b) 
correlational (i.e. non-experimental). According to Campbell and Stanley (1963), the 
main difference between correlational and experimental research designs is that one 
manipulates the variables being examined (i.e. experimental) and the other observes 
those variables without getting involved (i.e. correlational).  
 According to Kerlinger (1986), there are many strengths and weaknesses of using 
laboratory experiments to investigate phenomena. For example, one of the main 
advantages is the researcher‟s ability to have some control over the experiment 
(Kerlinger, 1986). In addition, laboratory experiments give the researcher the possibility 
of being able to easily randomize the sample population into experimental groups 
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(Kerlinger, 1986). However, the fundamental weakness of laboratory experiments deals 
with the strength of the independent variables (i.e. groups). In short, because laboratory 
experiments “are created for special purposes, it can be said that the effects of 
experimental manipulations are usually weak” (Kerlinger, 1986, p. 367-368). 
 Campbell and Stanley (1963) proposed that there are three different types of 
experiments: a) pre-experimental design, b) true experimental design, and c) quasi-
experimental design. Pre-experimental designs have their own advantages but are seen 
as being rather simplistic, and have been criticized for their many limitations and issues 
with invalidity (Campbell & Stanley, 1963).  
The main problem with pre-experimental designs, as well as quasi-experimental 
designs, is their lack of a randomized sample from the population. True experimental 
designs take care of this randomization problem. These designs are arguably the 
preferred experimental design because of their control over factors threatening internal 
and external validity (Campbell & Stanley, 1963). Because this study randomly assigns 
participants to treatment, the current study used a true experiment; a variation of the 
posttest-only control group design. The software used in this experiment (i.e. 
Qualtrics.com) randomly assigned participants to one of the three groups. 
Why Use a Posttest-Only Control Group Design? 
 In the posttest-only control group design, there is an experimental group that 
receives a treatment and a control group that does not (Gall, Gall, & Borg, 2003). The 
current study had a slight variation to the posttest-only control group design; it had two 
treatments. In the current study, the two experimental treatments were the participatory 
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pricing mechanisms: a) NYOP and b) PWYW. The control group received the traditional 
fixed-price treatment (i.e. no-treatment).  
Gall et al. (2003) suggested that post-test only control group experimental design 
is preferred if “you are unable to locate a suitable pretest, or when there is a possibility 
that the pretest has an effect on the experimental treatment” (p. 395). In the current 
study, if a pretest asked participants about their perceptions of participation in setting 
price, it is likely they would have altered their perceptions and sought to focus on 
participating in pricing, rather than submitting bids. This change in behavior is called a 
“reactive or interaction effect of testing,” and can jeopardize external validity (Campbell 
& Stanley, 1963, p. 6). Furthermore, internal validity could have been affected by 
conducting a pretest in the current study. For example, those participants in the control 
group may realize they are not being allowed to participate in price setting when others 
are, causing artificial negative emotions, called compensatory equalization of treatments 
(Gall et al., 2003). 
 Traditionally, if the posttest-only control group design has more than one 
experimental treatment, it is part of a factorial design (Campbell & Stanley, 1963). In the 
factorial design, the experimental group is compared to levels within the treatment 
(Campbell & Stanley, 1963). However, the current study did not attempt to determine 
different levels within the participatory pricing mechanism. Rather, it sought to 
determine consumer perceptions based on different experimental treatments. Therefore, 
the current study was a posttest-only control group design with multiple treatments, not a 
factorial design.  
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 Kerlinger (1986) proposed that it can be beneficial to add more treatment groups 
to the post-test only control group model in order to help test the hypotheses. For 
example, Kerlinger (1986) suggested that adding treatments to the posttest-only control 
group design “can test several hypotheses at one time” (p. 306). Therefore, the current 
study added multiple treatment groups to give the experimental design the ability to test 
multiple hypotheses at the same time.  
Validity Issues 
 There are two main types of validity that should be addressed when conducting 
experiments: a) internal and b) external validity (Campbell & Stanley, 1963; Field & 
Hole, 2003; Gall et al., 2003; Kerlinger, 1986). Both of these types of validity are briefly 
examined in this section. In addition, those types of validity that are of particular 
concern to the current study are described. 
According to Gall et al. (2003), internal validity is concerned with the ability of 
the researcher to control the variables being assessed enough to attribute effects to the 
experimental treatment. In other words, is the researcher really measuring the variable 
being evaluated (Hair, Anderson, Tatham, and Black, 1998)? Kerlinger (1986) suggested 
that internal validity is based on the ability of the research to limit anything from 
affecting the control within the design. 
There are many factors threatening internal validity (e.g. history, maturation, 
testing, instrumentation, statistical regression, selection, mortality, experimental 
treatment diffusion, compensatory rivalry by the control group, compensatory 
equalization of treatments, resentful demoralization of the control group, and 
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interactions of any of these) (Campbell & Stanley, 1963; Gall et al., 2003). However, 
some factors threatening internal validity are more prevalent in certain types of 
experimental designs (Campbell & Stanley, 1963).  
In the posttest-only control group design there are few issues that are of major 
concern to internal validity. However, ignoring their potential threat is not acceptable. 
Therefore, the various threats to internal validity and how they were controlled for in the 
current study are examined. History, maturation, testing, instrumentation, and 
experimental morality are all issues dealing with pretest evaluations, and do not apply in 
the current study (Campbell & Stanley, 1963). Statistical regression and selection both 
deal with how the sample is selected and assigned. Because the current sample was 
selected from a convenience sample, and assigned using randomization, both of these 
threats were controlled for. Experimental treatment diffusion, compensatory rivalry by 
the control group, compensatory equalization of treatments, and resentful demoralization 
of the control group deal with participants interacting and behaving differently based on 
the group they were assigned to. These threats were controlled for by randomly 
assigning the participants to groups and not allowing interaction among participants 
during the experiment. 
The other groups of threats to validity deal with external validity. According to 
Calder, Phillips, and Tybout (1982), external validity is concerned with “whether or not 
an observed causal relationship should be generalized to and across different measures, 
persons, settings, and times” (p. 240). In addition, Winer (1999) suggested that 
generalizability is the central concern of external validity. Furthermore, Lynch (1982) 
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found that generalizability is based on the phenomenon (behavior) being examined. 
Beyond generalizability of the measures, Kerlinger (1968) suggested that researchers 
should also be concerned with the generalizability of the sample being used. 
There are many factors threatening external validity (e.g. reactive or interaction 
effects of testing and the treatment, interaction effect of selection and experimental 
treatment, multiple-treatment inferences, population validity, random assignment in 
experiments, and restricted number of participants) (Campbell & Stanley, 1963; Field & 
Hole, 2003; Gall et al., 2003). Issues of reactive or interaction effects of testing and the 
treatment and multiple-treatment inferences apply to studies using a pre-test, and 
therefore are of little concern to the current study (Campbell & Stanley, 1963). The 
interaction effect of selection and experimental treatment, population validity, random 
assignment in experiments, and restricted number of participants deal with the validity of 
the sample (Campbell & Stanley, 1963; Field & Hole, 2003; Gall et al., 2003). In other 
words, does the sample generalize to the population that would encounter the 
participatory pricing mechanisms? The current study uses a convenience sample, which 
has been the topic of debate among many scholars (Peterson, 2001; Winer, 1999).  
Participants 
Participants were undergraduate students taking courses at a large or small 
southwestern university. These students were selected from multiple undergraduate 
courses (both in class and online based). Students were given extra credit for their 
participation in the experiment in some classes. Some students were asked to participate 
in the experiment without extra credit being offered (N=85). Following analysis of 
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demographic information (i.e. age, gender, and ethnicity), few differences appeared 
between those participants receiving extra credit and those that did not. For example, the 
mean gender was similar in both groups (M = 1.45, 1 = female, 2 = male), as well as 
ethnicity (primarily White, non-Hispanics). However, age was slightly different between 
the two groups. The extra credit group was slightly younger (M = 21.35) than the non-
extra credit group (M = 25.00). When the MANOVA was run between the extra credit 
and non-extra credit groups, no differences were found. 
After students were informed of the extra credit, and they agreed to participate, 
they were randomly assigned to one of three groups. Therefore, the participants were not 
taken from a random sample, but they were randomly assigned to groups.  
Because their participation in the study was voluntary, if the students chose not 
to participate, an optional alternative assignment was given if extra credit was requested 
and allowed by the instructor. The students were also informed that they may stop the 
study at any time without damage to their reputation with the universities or instructor of 
the course they are in. In addition, an information sheet was given to the students prior to 
the study beginning. 
Several scholars have debated the topic of using students in experimental studies 
(i.e. Lynch, 1982; Peterson, 2001). For example, Peterson (2001) conducted a meta-
analysis assessing the use of college students as subjects in consumer research. He found 
that college student responses were “slightly more homogeneous than those of 
nonstudent subjects,” suggesting researchers should exercise caution when using student 
  
77 
 
populations (Peterson, 2001, p. 450). He further suggested that studies using student 
populations should be replicated with nonstudent subjects (Peterson, 2001). 
Pricing Mechanism Design & Procedure 
According to Hinz and Spann (2008), research in participatory pricing has 
focused on two broad managerial questions: a) How do consumers behave in a bidding 
situation like NYOP auctions? And, b) what is the optimal design for participatory 
pricing, such as auctions? In addition, Shapiro and Zillante (2009) suggested this same 
line of research has also addressed how traditional fixed-price strategies compare to 
participatory pricing methods. Furthermore, they proposed that this research also 
investigates the combination of fixed-price and participatory pricing.  
This experiment used a Houston Texan‟s football game as the context. This game 
was stated as being a Week 3 game; no opponent or date was described to the 
participants.  
 The rest of this section describes the design of the experimental group treatments 
(2 participatory pricing treatments, and 1 control group). The current study randomly 
assigned participants to one of three treatments.  The NYOP mechanism is somewhat 
complex, and therefore much of this section will describe this treatment. Following the 
NYOP treatment and design, PWYW pricing and the control group will be described. 
Name-Your-Own-Price Design  
This study included an assessment of three participatory pricing scenarios. The 
first was a NYOP scenario. The beginning screen explained to the participants that the 
NYOP offer is part of a fan appreciation event. The screen also gave the participants the 
  
78 
 
option of seating areas. The seating areas included the same seating sections they would 
find at this professional football game. The participants were not given the option to 
select an event date; this game was stated as being a Week 3 game and no opponent or 
date was described to the participants.  
NYOP Design: Optimal Participatory Pricing Design 
Much of the extant literature investigating participatory pricing has examined 
what the optimal design looks like. Several researchers have proposed designs as it 
relates to posted prices (Anderson, 2009), multiple bids (Cai et al., 2009; Bernhardt & 
Spann, 2010, Spann et al., 2004), adding a suggested retail price (Cai et al., 2009), and 
providing acceptance probability to bidders (Wilson & Zhang, 2008). Each of these 
design structures will be covered hereafter. 
Following the introduction section of the treatment, the participants saw the 
policies regarding bidding and acceptance. For example, they were told that when their 
bid is accepted/rejected they would receive a confirmation immediately following their 
submission. They were also informed that if their bid was accepted their credit card 
(already filled with pseudo information) would be immediately charged with the bid 
amount and a printable version of the ticket would be emailed to them.  
Traditionally, firms implementing NYOP strategies have only given the bidder 
one bid per 24 hours on identical bids. This has been seen in most industries using 
NYOP (i.e. ScoreBig, Priceline, Florida Panthers, and St. Louis Blues). However, some 
researchers have challenged this design. For example, Cai et al. (2009) found that when 
consumers are given a double-bid option, their final price paid is higher than the 
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traditional single-bid design. They also found that this is especially true when the 
inventory in low for the NYOP firm. In addition, Bernhardt and Spann (2010) found that 
“consumers bid up to higher values when they are allowed to bid repeatedly” (p. 233). 
Spann et al. (2004) echoed this idea when they found a single bid may reduce the seller‟s 
revenue by causing the consumer to search elsewhere for the good or service. Therefore 
in this study, if their bid was rejected, their pseudo credit card was not charged, and they 
had one more chance to have a successful bid. If they had a second unsuccessful bid, 
they were told they must wait 24 hours before bidding again on the same section. In 
other words, this study used a double bid format, and after an unsuccessful second bid 
that participants were required to bid for a different section. This increased their 
likelihood of success. 
In the participatory pricing mechanisms currently studied (i.e. NYOP & 
PWYW), firms sometimes offer a suggested retail price for the good or service. For 
example, according to Raju and Zhang (2010), “many of the 5 million visitors a year to 
the Metropolitan Museum of Art in New York pay $20 a person to enter, despite the sign 
that clearly specifies that the price is a „suggested donation‟” (p. 25). In their study of 
bidding models in the NYOP context, Cai et al. (2009) found that by adding the firm‟s 
retail price, consumer prices increase; regardless of the number of bids the consumer is 
allowed. Therefore, in addition to the information about successful and rejected bids, 
participants were informed of the face-value (regular) price of the event ticket. This 
helped the consumer form their bid/offer. This is especially useful for those consumers 
that do not have much experience with the firm‟s goods or services. These prices were 
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based off of the actual lowest price for the tickets in each section for the game. These 
prices were the same as those found on the team‟s website. Furthermore, the participants 
were informed that other fans have recently received up to 20% off the retail price. This 
historical percentage information is commonly provided by NYOP retailers (i.e. 
ScoreBig.com and Priceline). 
Pay-What-You-Want Design  
Some participants were randomly assigned to the PWYW pricing scenario. The 
beginning of this screen explained to the participants that the PWYW offer is part of a 
fan appreciation event. On the next screen, participants were asked to provide a price 
which they deemed acceptable for the event. In this section, the participants were 
provided a reference price; same as the NYOP group. However, the PWYW group was 
not told the history of percentage discounts (i.e. recent fans bids have been 20% off). In 
addition, regardless of the bid amount, the consumer received confirmation of the bids 
acceptance. They were also informed that once they submitted their offer, their pseudo 
credit card would be charged for that amount, regardless of the price.  
Control Group – Traditional Fixed-Price Design  
The traditional fixed-price purchase process was the treatment for the control 
group for the experiment. This group experienced a purchase situation very similar to the 
actual team‟s website. In this scenario, they were not given an option to submit bids; 
they were only allowed to search the sections they wished to sit in, and then purchase the 
tickets with pseudo credit card information. 
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Regardless of the experimental group the participant was randomly placed in, all 
participants received the same questions regarding their perceptions of the purchase 
process they encountered. 
Measures 
There were five sections of the study that use scaled measurements: a) price 
fairness perceptions, b) perceived value, c) willingness-to-pay estimation, d) purchase 
intentions, and e) demographics. Each of these measures are examined henceforth.  
Price Fairness 
The scale implemented was adapted from Hermann et al. (2007). In their study of 
the influence of price fairness on customer satisfaction, Hermann et al. (2007) tested 
several scales related to price fairness and satisfaction. One of these scales focused on 
the pricing procedure fairness. According to Hermann et al. (2007), their scale was based 
on procedural fairness. In Hermann et al.‟s (2007) study, their pricing procedure fairness 
scale reveal acceptable reliability (alpha = .85).  Item 1 was developed to focus on the 
price setting procedure. This item wording changed from “dealer” to “event promoter” 
and was written in the current study as, “The terms of this event promoter are fair.” Item 
2 again focused on the procedure, and again wording changed to “event promoter”. Item 
2 was written “The procedure of buying these tickets from the event promoter is fair. 
Finally the third item in this set came from procedural justice theory and focused on the 
consumer involvement with the price setting. Item 3 was written “My involvement in 
setting the price caused me to feel the price I received was fair. All items were listed 
following the statement, “After reviewing these scenarios, please answer the following 
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statements. Before you answer, think about the purchase experience you just had.” The 
participants were then asked to respond on a 7-point Likert scale. The scale was valued 
as the following: 1 = strongly disagree, 2 = disagree, 3 = somewhat disagree, 4 = neither 
agree nor disagree, 5 = somewhat agree, 6 = agree, 7 = strongly agree. 
Perceived Value 
 The scale used in the current study was adapted from the scale developed by 
Petrick (2002). The items were used with slight variations to the wording for the 
statements. For example, “ticket” was used to indicate the item being purchased. In 
addition, “team” was used to indicate the purchase from a team. Regardless, this scale 
focuses on factors related to quality, emotional response, monetary price, behavioral 
price, and reputation. In Petrick‟s (2002) paper, these items were used together to 
identify a model of perceived value.  
The quality factor items came from recreation and tourism managers and 
Zeithaml (1988). Item 1 stated: “The purchase was of outstanding quality.” Item 2 
stated: “The purchase was very reliable.” Item 3 stated: “The purchase was very 
dependable.” Item 4 stated “The purchase was very consistent.” In Petrick‟s (2002) 
paper, composite reliability scores for this factor were tested three times (one pretest, 
and two separate tests). All tests reveals no issues with internal consistency (pretest = 
.79, test 1 = .93, test 2 = .92). 
The emotional response factor items were developed from judgments about the 
good or service and how much pleasure was gained from the purchase. Item 1 stated: 
“The purchase made me feel good.” Item 2 stated: “The purchase gave me pleasure.” 
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Item 3 stated: “The purchase gave me a sense of joy.” Item 4 stated “The purchase 
makes me feel delighted.” Item 5 stated: “The purchase gave me happiness.” In Petrick‟s 
(2002) paper, composite reliability scores for this factor were tested three times (one 
pretest, and two separate tests). All tests reveals no issues with internal consistency 
(pretest = .93, test 1 = .96, test 2 = .95). 
The monetary price factor items focused on the price the consumer paid. Item 1 
stated: “The ticket was a good buy.” Item 2 stated: “The ticket is worth the money.” Item 
3 stated: “The ticket is fairly priced.” Item 4 stated “The ticket is reasonably priced.” 
Item 5 stated: “The ticket is economical.” Item 6 stated: “The ticket appears to be a good 
bargain.” In Petrick‟s (2002) paper, composite reliability scores for this factor were 
tested three times (one pretest, and two separate tests). All tests reveals no issues with 
internal consistency (pretest = .90, test 1 = .94, test 2 = .94). 
The behavioral response factor items focused on the non-monetary price the 
consumer had to pay by purchasing the good or service. Item 1 stated: “The ticket was 
an easy buy.” Item 2 stated: “The ticket required little energy to purchase.” Item 3 stated: 
“The ticket was easy to shop for.” Item 4 stated “The ticket required little effort to buy.” 
Item 5 stated: “The ticket was easily bought.” In Petrick‟s (2002) paper, composite 
reliability scores for this factor were tested three times (one pretest, and two separate 
tests). All tests reveals no issues with internal consistency (pretest = .92, test 1 = .96, test 
2 = .95). 
The reputation factor items were developed from the prestige gained from 
purchasing that good or service from the firm. Item 1 stated: “The team has a good 
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reputation.” Item 2 stated: “The team is well respected.” Item 3 stated: “The team is well 
thought of.” Item 4 stated “The team has status.” Item 5 stated: “The team is reputable.” 
In Petrick‟s (2002) paper, composite reliability scores for this factor were tested three 
times (one pretest, and two separate tests). All tests reveals no issues with internal 
consistency (pretest = .85, test 1 = .94, test 2 = .92). 
All items were listed following the statement, “After reviewing these scenarios, 
please answer the following statements. Before you answer, think about the purchase 
experience you just had.” The participants were then asked to respond on a 7-point 
Likert scale. The scale was valued as the following: 1 = strongly disagree, 2 = disagree, 
3 = somewhat disagree, 4 = neither agree nor disagree, 5 = somewhat agree, 6 = agree, 7 
= strongly agree. 
Willingness-to-Pay 
According to Spann et al. (2004), bids in participatory pricing scenarios are not 
an indication of an individual‟s WTP. They argued that researchers seeking to determine 
WTP of individual consumers should assess this separately. Because the participants are 
not actually bidding in all treatments in this study, WTP after their exposure to each 
scenario needed to be assessed. 
One must be aware of the limitations of assessing WTP in a hypothetical 
situation (i.e. no purchase is required of the participants). Voelckner (2006) found that 
WTP levels are significantly higher in hypothetical situations. Therefore, the results of 
the WTP assessment should be taken with caution, knowing that these values were likely 
higher than if the consumer was actually spending the money.  
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Donaldson et al. (1997) found that there are three separate types of WTP 
assessments. They suggested that the most commonly used WTP assessment is the open-
ended approach. However, they found that the “payment scale technique leads to more 
valid WTP values than use of the open-ended approach” (Donaldson et al., 1997, p. 79). 
Therefore the scale items that were used were adapted from Donaldson et al.‟s (1997) 
scale technique. Keep in mind that this scale was the only one used to assess WTP. The 
prices used in the payment scale were determined based on the retail prices for the actual 
game. The average price (rounded) of all the sections was placed as the median value on 
this scale. The bottom anchor value was $0, with equal increments to the median. The 
highest anchor was twice the amount of the median value (over $360).  
Purchase Intentions 
Next, the participant‟s purchase intentions following exposure to the 
participatory pricing mechanisms were examined. The scale was adapted from Zeithaml, 
et al. (1996). Zeithaml et al. (1996) sought to examine multiple items that influence a 
consumer behavioral intentions. In doing this, they focused on items related to purchase 
intention. These items were developed based on literature investigating loyalty. 
Adaptions were made with the wording of the items. For example, their study list XYZ 
as the company; the current study used “types of events” as a replacement. These items‟ 
internal consistency was tested in Zeithaml et al.‟s (1996) study using Cronbach‟s alpha, 
across four companies. The scores for Cronbach‟s alpha revealed no issues with internal 
consistency (scores ranged from .93 to .94). 
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Item 1 focuses on spending of money and stated: “I consider these types of 
events as my first choice for my entertainment dollar.” Item 2 focused on attendance at 
future events (i.e. ticket purchase) and stated: “I will likely attend more events of this 
kind in the next few years.” The last item focuses on the purchase using the method of 
purchase and stated: “There is a good chance I will buy tickets using a method similar to 
the method I encountered (if available).” 
All items were listed following the statement, “After reviewing these scenarios, 
please answer the following statements. Before you answer, think about the purchase 
experience you just had.” The participants were then asked to respond on a 7-point 
Likert scale. The scale was valued as the following: 1 = strongly disagree, 2 = disagree, 
3 = somewhat disagree, 4 = neither agree nor disagree, 5 = somewhat agree, 6 = agree, 7 
= strongly agree. 
Demographics 
Next, the demographic scale items were based on open ended, categorical, and 
dichotomous (i.e. gender) variables. For example, the question regarding age was open 
ended, then cleaned to a whole number. The item regarding age asked: “What best 
describes your age?” The participants were then asked to fill in a text box with their 
response. The item asking about gender was a dichotomous variable. It asked: “What 
best describes your gender?” Possible answers to this question were: “Female” and 
“Male.” The last item used in this study regarding demographics related to ethnicity. The 
question asked: “What best describes your ethnicity?” Possible answers included: 
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“African American,” “Asian or Asian American,” “Hispanic,” “Native American,” 
“White, non-Hispanic,” or “Other.” 
Statistical Analysis 
Based on the procedural justice literature, Greenwell et al. (2008) used 
quantitative methods (hierarchical regression) to determine what impacts university 
students‟ satisfaction with sport ticket pricing policies. Park et al. (2010) used procedural 
justice theory to determine price acceptability of national park visitors through 
quantitative methods (regression). Therefore, the current study also used quantitative 
methods to assess differences between groups (i.e. MANOVA, ANOVA). 
To better understand the consumer perceptions following participation in one of 
the three experimental treatments, the current study took the results of measures 
following exposure to each treatment and tested them as dependent variables. The 
independent variables were coded by experimental treatments (NYOP = 1, PWYW = 2, 
and Fixed = 3). A MANOVA was used to assess differences between these three groups 
based on the dependent variables (price fairness, perceived value, willingness-to-pay, 
and purchase intentions). Not all treatments revealed results that allowed the researcher 
to control for seat location, so it was excluded from this analysis. The results of this 
analysis are examined in more depth in chapter IV. 
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CHAPTER IV 
RESULTS  
The purpose of this study is to better understand the effects participatory pricing 
strategies have on consumer perceptions and behaviors in a sport event pricing scenario. 
In Chapter III, research methodology for the current study was described. This included 
discussions of the research strategy, design, participant selection, pricing mechanism 
design and procedures, measures, and statistical analyses used. This chapter presents the 
results of the current study. The chapter begins with an analysis of the sample 
demographics. The rest of this chapter presents results of hypothesis testing.  
Sample Demographics 
  This study used a convenience sample of college students (N = 684). These 
students were enrolled in a variety of business, exercise/activity, and sport management 
courses at two universities; a large and a small southwestern university. The experiment 
was started by 809 participants with only 684 completing the study. Completion of the 
study, and their inclusion in the final data analysis, was determined by the participants 
submitting the questionnaire at the end. In other words, 125 participants were excluded 
because they failed to submit the questionnaire at the end. The majority of the 
participants began the experimental treatment, but never began the questionnaire. Those 
that were excluded but began the questionnaire were excluded because they only filled 
out the first section of the questionnaire, causing their responses to be omitted due to 
significant missing data. 
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  The participants were randomly assigned to one of the three treatments (e.g. 
NYOP, PWYW, and fixed price control group). The final sample size for each treatment 
was: a) NYOP (N = 215), b) PWYW (N = 246), and c) fixed price control group (N = 
223). 
  The sample in the current study had a close to even ratio of females to males. The 
sample consisted of 372 male (54.4%) and 307 female (44.9%) participants (note: 5 
participants chose not to respond to this question). The majority of the participants were 
White, non-Hispanic (N = 525, 76.8%). The next largest ethnicity groups were Hispanics 
(N = 73, 10.7%) and African American (N = 40, 5.8%). The remainder of the sample 
were Asian or Asian American (N = 22, 3.2%), Other (N = 15, 2.2%), Native American 
(N = 3, .4%), or those who chose not to respond to this question (N = 6, .9%). The 
participants‟ mean age was 21.64 years old (SD = 4.80). A summary of the demographic 
statistics are displayed in Table 4.1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
90 
 
Table 4.1:   
Demographic information of participants 
 
 
Average age, y 
 
 
21.64 
 
Gender, % 
       Female 
       Male 
 
 
 
44.9 
54.4 
 
 
Ethnicity, % 
       African American 
       Asian, or Asian American 
       Hispanic 
       Native American 
       White, non-Hispanic 
       Other or no answer 
 
 
 
5.8 
3.2 
10.7 
0.4 
76.8 
3.1 
 
 
 
Measures Statistics 
  Cronbach‟s alpha was calculated for each scale. According to Hair et al. (1998), 
Cronbach‟s alpha scores of .70 or higher are deemed acceptable. Results of the 
Cronbach‟s alpha test is listed in Table 4.2. Results revealed there were no issues of 
internal consistency with any measure (Price Fairness = .865, Perceived Value = .828, 
Purchase Intention = .757).  
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Table 4.2:  
Cronbach’s alpha scores 
 
Table Cronbach‟s Alpha 
 
Price Fairness 
     1.  Terms of promoter are fair  
     2.  Pricing procedure is fair 
     3.  Involvement in price is fair  
 
Perceived Value a 
     4.  Quality  
     5.  Emotional Response  
     6.  Monetary Price 
     7.  Reputation  
     8.  Behavioral Price  
 
Purchase Intentions 
     9.    First choice for my dollar  
     10.  Attend in future 
     11.  Use method again  
 
 
.865 
 
 
 
 
.825 
 
 
 
 
 
 
.757 
a All measures are mean scores. 
Note: All Cronbach‟s Alpha scores acceptable (values > .70). 
 
Multivariate Analysis of Variance 
To test for the differences between groups, multivariate analysis of variance 
(MANOVA) was used. The fixed factor was a grouping variable to determine the 
different groups. The fixed factor was labeled as: 1 = NYOP, 2 = PWYW, and 3 = Fixed 
(control). The dependent variables used in this analysis were mean scores from the scale 
items previously mentioned (price fairness, perceived value, willingness-to-pay, and 
purchase intentions). The statistical software used for the analysis was SPSS 19. Using 
the multivariate general linear model function, the MANOVA was used, requesting 
outputs for descriptive statistics and estimates of effect size. To determine if there was a 
significant multivariate effect, Wilks‟ lambda was analyzed. The analysis revealed there 
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was indeed a significant multivariate effect, Wilks‟ λ = .877, F (8, 1354) = 11.477, p = 
.000. Due to this significant effect, the univariate statistics were analyzed. A discussion 
of these statistics is located in the hypothesis testing section below. In addition, results 
are shown in Table 4.3. 
 
 
Table 4.3: 
MANOVA for participatory pricing 
 
Dependent Variable df F sig. Partial η2 
 
Price Fairness 
   
Perceived Value  
 
Willingness-to-pay 
 
Purchase Intentions 
 
Error 
 
 
2 
 
2 
 
2 
 
2 
 
680 
 
4.695 
 
11.631 
 
18.355 
 
2.135 
 
.009 
 
.000 
 
.000 
 
.119 
 
.014 
 
.033 
 
.051 
 
.006 
 
 
 
Analysis of Variance 
To test for the differences between groups based on the final price the participant 
paid, analysis of variance (ANOVA) was used. The fixed factor was a grouping variable 
to determine the different groups. The fixed factor was labeled as: 1 = NYOP, 2 = 
PWYW, and 3 = Fixed (control). The dependent variable used in this analysis was the 
means scores for the final price paid (i.e. the final accepted bid in NYOP, the offer in 
PWYW, or the selected price in the control group). The statistical software used for the 
analysis was SPSS 19. Using the ultivariate general linear model function, the ANOVA  
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was used, requesting outputs for descriptive statistics and estimates of effect size. 
Results revealed a significant difference between groups, F (2, 650) = 5.904, p = .003, 
partial η2 = .018. Results of ANOVA are shown in Table 4.4. 
 
 
Table 4.4: 
ANOVA for final price paid 
 
Dependent Variable df F sig. r2 
 
Group 
   
Error 
 
 
2 
 
650 
 
 
5.904 
 
 
 
 
.003 
 
 
 
.018 
 
 
 
 
 
Hypothesis Testing 
  To test each hypothesis, MANOVA and ANOVA was used. In chapter II, five 
hypotheses were introduced. The outcome of each hypothesis is presented in Table 4.5.  
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Table 4.5:  
Outcome of hypotheses  
 
Hypothesis Summary 
Statistical 
Analysis 
Outcome 
Hypothesis 
Acceptance 
1 
Price fairness 
evaluations will be 
significantly different 
between experimental 
groups. 
MANOVA 
Fixed higher than 
NYOP. No 
difference between 
PWYW & Fixed 
Accepted 
2 
Perceived value 
evaluations will be 
significantly different 
between experimental 
groups. 
MANOVA 
PWYW & Fixed 
higher than NYOP. 
No difference 
between PWYW & 
Fixed 
Accepted 
3 
Willingness-to-pay 
evaluations will be 
significantly different 
between experimental 
groups. 
MANOVA 
NYOP higher than 
PWYW & Fixed. 
No difference 
between PWYW & 
Fixed 
Accepted 
4 
Purchase intention 
evaluations will be 
significantly different 
between experimental 
groups. 
MANOVA No differences Rejected 
5 
Final price paid will be 
significantly different 
between experimental 
groups. 
ANOVA 
PWYW & Fixed 
higher than NYOP. 
No difference 
between PWYW & 
Fixed 
Accepted 
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  Hypothesis 1 states that price fairness evaluations will be significantly different 
between experimental groups. Results showed that the effects pricing strategies have on 
price fairness was significant, F (2, 680) = 4.695, p = .009, partial η2 = .014, accepting 
hypothesis 1. The Duncan post hoc test revealed fixed price (control) (M = 5.564, SD = 
1.018) had mean scores significantly higher than the NYOP treatment (M = 5.188, SD = 
1.435), and that PWYW (M = 5.43, SD = 1.451) was not significantly different than 
NYOP or fixed price. This suggests that the NYOP mechanism was not able to evoke 
higher price fairness evaluations than the traditional fixed price treatment. In addition, 
the PWYW treatment is not any more effective at evoking positive price fairness 
evaluations than the traditional method. However, the two participatory pricing 
mechanisms differed; PWYW was able educe higher price fairness evaluations than the 
NYOP treatment. 
Hypothesis 2 states that perceived value evaluations will be significantly 
different between experimental groups. Results showed that the effects pricing strategies 
have on perceived value was significant, F (2, 680) = 11.631, p = .000, partial η2 = .033, 
accepting hypothesis 2. The Duncan post hoc test revealed PWYW (M = 5.401, SD = 
.895) and fixed price (control) (M = 5.239, SD = .836) had mean scores significantly 
higher than the NYOP treatment (M = 4.981, SD = 1.071), and that PWYW was not 
significantly different than fixed price. This suggests that the PWYW mechanism may 
be better able to at evoking perceived value following a purchase scenario than the 
NYOP treatment. However, it is important to note that the PWYW mechanism was not 
able to do this any better than the traditional fixed price mechanism. Just as the PWYW 
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treatment, the traditional fixed price mechanism was better able to evoke perceived value 
from a purchase scenario than the NYOP treatment. 
Hypothesis 3 states that WTP evaluations will be significantly different between 
experimental groups. Results showed that the effects pricing strategies have on WTP 
was significant, F (2, 681) = 18.355, p = .000, partial η2 = .051, accepting hypothesis 3. 
The Duncan post hoc test revealed the NYOP treatment had mean scores significantly 
higher than the PWYW and fixed price (control), and that PWYW was not significantly 
different than fixed price. The WTP mean score for the NYOP treatment was 15.63 
($146.30, SD = 8.309), while PWYW was 11.90 ($109.00, SD = 6.015) and Fixed was 
12.69 ($116.90, SD = 6.195). This suggests that while the NYOP treatment was not able 
to evoke more positive perceptions (i.e. price fairness and perceived value) than the 
PWYW or fixed groups, it was able to raise the participant‟s WTP in the future. 
Hypothesis 4 states purchase intention evaluations will be significantly different 
between experimental groups. Results showed that the effects pricing strategies have on 
purchase intentions was not significant, F (2, 680) = 2.135, p = .119, partial η2 = .006, 
rejecting hypothesis 4. This suggests that participants in each group did not differ  
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significantly in their future purchase behavior intentions (NYOP M = 4.7488, SD = 1.35; 
PWWY M = 4.701, SD = 1.388; Fixed M = 4.946, SD = 1.277). 
Hypothesis 5 states that the final price paid will be significantly different 
between experimental groups. Results showed that the effects pricing strategies have on 
actual price paid was significant, F (2, 650) = 5.904, p = .003, partial η2 = .018, 
accepting hypothesis 5.  The Duncan post hoc test reveals PWYW and fixed price 
(control) groups paid significantly higher than the NYOP treatment participants, and that 
PWYW was not significantly different than fixed price. The actual price paid for the 
PWYW treatment was $99.83 (SD = 62.008), fixed price group was $101.71 (SD = 
27.636), and NYOP was $87.24 (SD = 56.917). This suggests participants that are given 
complete control over the price they pay will pay, as a group average, similar to the 
traditional fixed price mechanism. Interestingly, these results also suggest that the 
NYOP group paid, as a group average, significantly less than the PWYW and fixed price 
group. 
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CHAPTER V 
DISCUSSION 
The purpose of this study is to better understand the effects participatory pricing 
strategies have on consumer perceptions and behaviors in a sport event pricing scenario. 
In Chapter IV, results of the current study were presented. This chapter discusses these 
results. The chapter begins with a summary of the results, followed by study 
implications. The final sections of this chapter addresses study limitations and future 
research directions.   
Summary of Results 
  The statement of purpose for the current study was presented in Chapter I and 
suggests this study was developed to better understand the effects participatory pricing 
strategies have on consumer perceptions and behaviors in a sport event pricing scenario. 
This study focused its purpose on consumer evaluations of price fairness, perceived 
value, willingness-to-pay, and purchase intentions.  
  Hypothesis 1 attempted to determine the affect participatory pricing mechanisms 
have on price fairness evaluations. This hypothesis was accepted, suggesting the type of 
pricing mechanism will influence a consumer‟s perception of price fairness. Specifically, 
these results found that the traditional fixed price mechanism was able to evoke greater 
price fairness evaluations than the NYOP mechanism. These results are not in line with 
current literature regarding procedural justice. For example, procedural justice suggests 
that when consumers have a say in the final price they pay, they will likely have more 
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positive price fairness evaluations than if they had no voice (Greenwell et al., 2008; 
Haws & Bearden, 2006; Kim et al., 2010; Park et al., 2010).  
  However, hypothesis 1 also revealed that there was no significant difference 
between the PWYW and fixed price groups when investigating price fairness. Therefore, 
it can be suggested that while not all participatory pricing strategies increase price 
fairness perceptions greater than the traditional fixed price methods (i.e. NYOP), giving 
consumer complete control over the final price they pay (PWYW) could induce price 
fairness perceptions similar to the fixed price method. 
  In addition to fixed price revealing significantly high perceptions of price 
fairness, the PWYW was not significantly higher than the NYOP on this variable. This 
suggests that when firms are entertaining the idea of implementing participatory pricing 
strategies in order to increase price fairness perceptions, there is likely no difference 
between PWYW and NYOP. This is an important finding because this relationship has 
not been investigated in extant participatory pricing literature. 
Hypothesis 2 attempted to determine the affect participatory pricing mechanisms 
have on perceived value evaluations. The hypothesis was accepted, suggesting the type 
of pricing mechanism influences perceived value. For instance, the results suggest that 
the PWYW mechanism is more effective at increasing the perceive value of consumers 
than the NYOP mechanism, following a ticket purchase scenario. In other words, when 
consumers are given complete control over the final price they pay for a sport event 
ticket, they will likely have higher perceptions of value than if they were given partial 
control. While this relationship has not been investigated in the extant participatory 
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pricing literature, Greenwell et al. (2008) found that when sport consumers have more of 
a say in the price setting procedure, they will be more satisfied with the purchase. 
Therefore, one could argue that positive perceptions could be associated with increased 
control.  
In addition, these results relating to hypothesis 2 suggest that traditional fixed 
price strategies increase a consumer‟s perceived value more than NYOP strategies. This 
suggests the participants in this experiment found less value in the outcome when faced 
with the NYOP scenario than the fixed price scenario. While this relationship may seem 
odd, given that fixed price and PWYW (giving complete control to the consumer) do not 
differ, one may draw from dual entitlement theory to explain this anomalous 
relationship. Dual entitlement theory is based on the alignment of a firm‟s costs to 
consumer prices (Bolton & Alba, 2006). Haws and Bearden (2006) propose that dual 
entitlement theory argues firms are entitled to a reasonable (fair) profit, while consumers 
are entitled to a reasonable (fair) price. Applied to the current experiment, dual 
entitlement theory may suggest that by causing the consumer to bid against the firm (the 
sport team) may cause them to feel the firm is seeking unreasonable profits. In contrast, 
the PWYW scenario does not require bidding (i.e. there is no rejection, seeking a higher 
price paid); instead the firm accepts whatever the participant offers. In other words, by 
not rejecting bids, the consumers in the PWYW scenario may feel the firm is not seeking 
unreasonable profits, but truly believe the promotion is to thank the fans. 
Furthermore, results suggest that consumer‟s perceived value is not significantly 
different following a PWYW or a fixed price mechanism. This suggests that even though 
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the firm is offering a scenario where the consumer‟s offer cannot be rejected, they are 
still not providing a higher value to the consumer. In other words, participants may see 
the promotion as being a nice gesture towards fans, but it does not change how they feel 
about the value of the firm‟s offerings. 
Hypothesis 3 attempted to determine the effect participatory pricing mechanisms 
have on WTP evaluations. This hypothesis was accepted, suggesting the type of pricing 
mechanism influences a consumer‟s future WTP. Interestingly, WTP evaluations were 
higher in the NYOP scenarios than any other mechanism. This suggests that while the 
NYOP treatment was not able to evoke more positive perceptions (i.e. price fairness and 
perceived value) than the PWYW or fixed groups, it was able to raise the participant‟s 
willingness-to-pay in the future. These results could be explained by extant bidding 
behavior research. Several researchers investigating bidding behavior of NYOP 
consumers suggest that consumers will place higher bids using the double-bid method 
(Bernhardt and Spann, 2010; Cai et al., 2009; Spann et al. 2004). This method was 
chosen in the current study and may explain why the WTP was higher for the NYOP 
group participants. For example, Cai et al. (2009) found that when consumers are given a 
double-bid option, their final price paid is higher than the traditional single-bid design. 
In addition, Bernhardt and Spann (2010) found that “consumers bid up to higher values 
when they are allowed to bid repeatedly” (p. 233). Spann et al. (2004) echoed this idea 
when they found a single bid may reduce the seller‟s revenue by causing the consumer to 
search elsewhere for the good or service. Therefore, consumer may be willing to pay 
more if they are allowed to bid strategically, rather than selection (fixed price) or 
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automatically accepted offers (PWYW). This may also explain why the current results 
found that the PWYW and fixed price groups did not significantly differ in their WTP. 
Hypothesis 4 attempted to determine the effect participatory pricing mechanisms 
have on purchase intention evaluations. This hypothesis was rejected, suggesting that the 
pricing mechanism does not change consumers‟ future intentions. These findings are not 
in line with the extant participatory pricing literature.  For example, Kim et al. (2009) 
found that using PWYW pricing mechanisms has increased consumer purchase 
intentions. Likewise, according to Chandran and Morwitz (2005), consumers that 
participate in the price setting process feel they have more control over the price, leading 
to higher intent to purchase the good or service. Furthermore, McDonald and Stavros 
(2007) found that consumers are more likely to repurchase if their contributions are 
being recognized by the firm. Finally, researchers from multiple disciplines found that 
when consumers have a say in the price, they will like have positive price perceptions, 
and in turn, have increased purchase intentions (Greenwell et al., 2008; Haws & 
Bearden, 2006; Kim et al., 2010; Park et al., 2010). Due to this rejection, this 
relationship may need to be examined more in future research. 
Hypothesis 5 attempted to determine the effect participatory pricing mechanisms 
have on the amount the participant will actually pay at the end of the pricing scenario. 
This hypothesis was accepted, suggesting that the pricing mechanism will influence how 
much the consumer pays at the end of the ticket purchase. For example, both PWYW 
and fixed price groups paid more (on average) than the NYOP group.  
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Most interesting to the current study, PWYW and the traditional fixed price 
group did not differ significantly in the average price paid at the end of the ticket 
purchase scenario. In other words, the PWYW pricing mechanism did not induce 
significantly more or less average prices than the fixed price mechanism. This indicates 
that the hypothetical team in this experiment would receive the same average price per 
patron in the PWYW and fixed price scenario. This suggests that sport teams seeking an 
innovative promotional pricing mechanism that positively affects consumers‟ perceived 
value, without reducing the average price paid per patron, should consider PWYW 
pricing. These results fall in line with the extant PWYW pricing cases. For example, in 
Kim et al.‟s (2009) three studies of PWYW pricing implementation, they found that in 
all three scenarios consumers “provided with a reference price paid 104% of the regular 
prices to the seller” (Kim et al., 2009, p. 53). Kim et al. (2010) also found that PWYW 
can increase firm profits. In the sport industry, Mansfield Town Club implemented 
PWYW pricing for one soccer event. According to the team, for the night of the 
promotion, the gate revenue was equal if not greater than the average game (F.C. 
Business, 2010).  
While the prices paid in the PWYW group were not significantly different then 
the fixed price group, it is important to note that the distribution of offers in the PWYW 
is positively skewed while the fixed price selections were negatively skewed. For 
example, the PWYW mean score was $99.83 (SD = 62.008) with skewness value of 
2.178. According to Hair et al. (1998), this indicates that there are few values that are 
large. In addition, Hair et al. (1998) suggest that skewness values greater than 1 indicate 
  
104 
 
a substantial skewness. On the other hand, the fixed price mean score was $101.71 (SD 
= 27.636) with a skewness value of -.788. According to Hair et al. (1998), this indicates 
that there are few values that are small. These results might suggest that while the 
average price paid is not significantly different between the PWYW and fixed price a 
group, the PWYW group has many offers below the normally distributed mean. In other 
words, PWYW may have only a few participants the offer large sums while many offer 
small amounts. This could be explained by controlling for loyalty and should be 
investigated more in future studies. 
One of the concerns related to the amount paid in the PWYW scenario is the 
ability for the consumer to pay nothing at all for the good or service. In the current study, 
results revealed that only 1.2% of participants paid nothing at all. This result is similar to 
Kim et al.‟s (2009) finding. Kim et al. (2009) found that consumers in each of the three 
studies paid significantly greater than zero, including “only a few customers paying very 
low prices and that none decided to pay zero in the three studies” (p. 51). Likewise, 
when Radiohead offered their new album, In Rainbows, to consumers online using 
PWYW, the average price per album was only $2.26. However, the band claims they 
made more on the PWYW promotion than if they sold it at the normal fixed-price (Raju 
& Zhang, 2010).  
Implications 
  The purpose of the current study is to better understand the effects participatory 
pricing strategies have on consumer perceptions and behaviors. The current findings 
reveal several implications for sport marketing practitioners. For example, the current 
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study found that participatory pricing influences consumer perception and the final 
prices they pay. Participatory pricing strategies are mechanisms that allow consumers to 
have a say in the final price they pay. In other words, the firm gives the consumer a 
voice (Park et al., 2010). Participatory pricing mechanisms used in the current study 
include Name-Your-Own-Price (NYOP) and Pay-What-You-Want (PWYW). Therefore, 
the first implication of this study suggests that if sport event promoters wish to modify 
consumer‟s perceptions of the event, they should consider participatory pricing 
strategies. More details into this effect are covered henceforth. 
  Another implication of the current study deals with the differences between the 
PWYW strategy and the traditional fixed price strategy. The implementation of 
participatory pricing, specifically PWYW mechanisms, have been found to be successful 
in scenarios where there is excess supply (low demand) and low marginal costs (Kim et 
al., 2010). It has been suggested that sporting events have a marginal cost close to zero, 
until the facility is full (Alexander, 2001; Leeds & Von Allmen, 2011). Therefore, it is 
argued that in a sport event scenario where there is excess supply (low attendance), 
participatory pricing strategies may be successful. To measure this success, the current 
study looked at several variables (price fairness, perceived value, willingness-to-pay, and 
final price paid) to determine the difference between the traditional fixed price strategy 
(i.e. the consumer picks a seat and pays the retail price) and a promotional strategy that 
allows the consumer to have complete control over the final price paid (i.e. PWYW). 
Results suggested that consumer experience these two scenarios did not differ from one 
another as it relates to perceptions (price fairness and perceived value), evaluations 
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(willingness-to-pay), and behavior (final price paid). This suggests that if firms attempt 
wish to implement a pricing promotion to increase attendance, but wish to maintain the 
value of the ticket in the minds of the consumers, PWYW pricing may be a viable 
option. Furthermore, these results suggest that firms may receive a final average group 
price similar to if there was no promotional strategy implemented at all. These finding 
are similar to scenarios where PWYW was implemented (Kim et al.,2009; Mansfield 
Town Club, UK). 
  When applying prospect theory, one can argue consumers make decisions based 
on subjective realities. In other words, when an individual is faced with a decision, they 
compare options based on perceptions of losses and gains from the outcome of the 
choices at hand. Furthermore, prospect theory suggests that consumer‟s weight 
perceived losses greater than gains (Tversky & Kahneman 1991). Some would argue that 
marketers should be concerned with negative consumer perceptions rather than the 
potential positive perceptions resulting from promotional pricing. This is of concern to 
the current study because NYOP yielded lower consumer perceptions for all variables 
except willingness-to-pay. By apply prospect theory‟s value function, the results of this 
study would suggest NYOP may create lower perceptions of price fairness and perceived 
value. This may be seen as a loss to consumers, which would in turn loom larger than if 
the potential benefits of increase willingness-to-pay values. 
  This non difference between PWYW and fixed price can also be examined when 
investigating the use of participatory pricing strategies and price sensitive consumers.  
Promotional pricing strategies, such as NYOP and PWYW, attracts consumers that make 
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their decisions primarily based on price; price sensitive consumers (Petrick, 2005). 
However, sport organizations may be weary of attracting this consumer because if they 
deem they do not receive a gain from the transaction (the lowest price possible), they 
may perceive the outcome as a loss. As previously discussed, prospect theory suggests 
losses weight larger than gains. Therefore, while price sensitive consumers are drawn to 
promotional pricing strategies, if the firm is not able to provide a gain for the consumer, 
they will likely have issues gaining discretionary spending from that group in the future. 
  Another implication of the current study focuses on the relationship between the 
traditional fixed price strategy and a participatory pricing strategy where the firm still 
has a say in the final price; NYOP. In the NYOP strategy consumers are asked to 
participate in a reverse pricing tactic (bidding against the team, not another consumer). 
Here the consumer is asked to place a bid, and if the bid is above a secret minimum 
threshold, the firm accepts the bid and the consumer received the good or service. The 
results revealed that the traditional fixed price strategy was more effective at inducing 
consumer perceptions (price fairness and perceived value) and behaviors (final prices 
paid) than the NYOP strategy. However, the NYOP mechanism in the current study led 
to higher willingness-to-pay values than the traditional fixed price strategy. This would 
indicate that while consumers did not perceive the price to be fairer and had a lower 
perceived value after the purchase, as well as a lower ultimate price paid, the NYOP 
mechanism was still able to lead consumers to increase the amount they would be 
willing to pay. In other words, if teams are seeking to raise a consumer‟s willingness-to-
pay amount for future purchases, they may consider NYOP mechanisms. However, this 
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implication should be taken with caution; NYOP was less affective in altering the 
consumer‟s mindset regarding fairness and value. 
  A further implication regarding the results of this study relate to the relationship 
between PWYW and NYOP mechanisms. The current study is the first to examine the 
differences in participatory pricing strategies and their effects on consumer perceptions. 
In other words, there is a paucity of research investigating the outcomes of NYOP versus 
PWYW. The findings of the current study suggest PWYW is more effective at 
increasing the consumers perceived value as well as the final price they pay. This may 
indicate that consumers may consider value when they participate in the price setting 
process.  In other words, in the PWYW scenario, consumers are given complete control, 
while the NYOP consumers are giving partial control (bids can be rejected by the team). 
Therefore, in the current study, the more control the participant had, the higher value 
perceptions, and the higher the price paid. In short, when teams give consumers 
complete control, they may be able to lead the consumer to focus more on perceived 
value, which could lead to greater price paid per patron. However, this statement should 
be taken with caution; the results also revealed the prices paid in the PWYW scenario to 
be positively skewed.  
  According to the theory of social relationships, consumers may evaluate their 
actions relative to their social peers (Kim et al., 2009). This is important for the next 
implication of the current study. Results suggest that the PWYW strategy influence 
consumers to pay similar to those engaging in the traditional pricing strategy, while both 
strategies prompt greater average price paid than the NYOP strategy. In other words, 
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PWYW and fixed price strategies are able to receive greater average prices paid per 
patron than NYOP. In addition, results suggest that while the PWYW data is positively 
skewed (there are relatively few large prices), only 1.2% of participants paid nothing in 
this scenario. Therefore, an implication of this study is that consumers bid in a way 
where they can get a discounted price, but still give the firm a reasonable price for the 
good. By applying dual entitlement theory (Bolton & Alba, 2006; Haws & Bearden, 
2006), one could deduce that when consumers have complete control over the price they 
pay, they will still pay what they feel is a fair price for the cost the firm incurs. In other 
words, if a team is looking to implement a promotional pricing strategy, and they are 
fearful of fans paying unreasonable prices, the current study suggests otherwise when 
implementing PWYW pricing. 
  The last potential implication of this study is related to price fairness. The results 
of the current study suggest that the NYOP mechanism does not influence price fairness 
perceptions more than traditional fixed price strategies. While hypothesis 1 was 
accepted, there was a significant difference between groups, this difference is not 
supported by the extant literature related to procedural justice. Procedural justice 
suggests that consumers will deem the price with positive levels of price fairness if they 
have a say in the final price. However, while to the means scores NYOP being 
significantly lower than fixed prices, the mean scores for the NYOP strategy was 
significantly lower than the PWYW strategy. Therefore, while procedural justice may 
not explain the difference between NYOP and traditional fixed price strategies, it would 
explain the difference between NYOP and PWYW. For example, in PWYW strategies 
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the consumer is given complete control, while the NYOP only gives partial control. 
Procedural justice would argue that by giving consumers complete control rather than 
partial control, firms are able to evoke positive price fairness perceptions. In short, when 
firms wish to use participatory pricing strategies, and which to maintain price fairness 
perceptions, they should consider using PWYW pricing. 
   Limitations  
  The greatest limitation to the current study is the use of a convenience sample. 
Instead of using probability sampling (i.e. randomized sampling), the current study used 
nonprobability sampling. According to Andrew, Pedersen, and McEvoy (2011), “one 
weakness of convenience samples is that they may not be representative of the target 
population” (p. 49). Therefore, the ideal sampling technique for the current study would 
have been probability sampling of a ticket purchasing population. For example, since the 
population under investigation is sport ticket purchasers, a more effective method of 
probability sampling would have been random sampling. According to Andrew et al. 
(2011), random samples give “every member of the population an equal probability of 
being selected” (p. 48). This would ensure a sample more representative of the target 
population. Therefore, readers should use caution when generalizing the current study‟s 
findings to the target population. According to Peterson (2001), studies that use student 
populations should be replicated with nonstudent subjects. Therefore, future studies 
should attempt to replicate these results with a nonstudent sample. 
  Another limitation to the current study is that it is contextually limited. The 
current study was assessing an online purchase scenario where the participants were 
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asked to participate in purchasing two tickets to a Houston Texans football game. 
Therefore, the findings from the current study should not be generalized. It is important 
for future research to examine the current variables in a different sport event ticketing 
scenario. Future studies should investigate the role price fairness, perceived value, 
purchase intentions, and willingness-to-pay play in the implementation participatory 
pricing strategies outside of American professional football using an actual ticket 
purchase setting. 
  In the experiment in the current study, the participants were told that they were to 
buy tickets for a Houston Texans week-3 game. The participants were not told who the 
opponent was for this game. This is a potential limitation due to the value many 
consumer place on the opponents of a sporting event. For example, Rascher et al. (2007) 
found that demand changes for sporting events based on many factors. In their study of 
variable ticket pricing, they found that teams will like change their ticket price based on 
the change in demand, which fluctuates with individual game characteristics. One of the 
characteristics that influence demand, and subsequently prices at sporting events is the 
quality of the opponent. In other words, fans will pay more when the team is playing a 
popular or successful team. Therefore, because the current experiment did not indicate 
the opponent, the results could be limited. 
  Another limitation based on the experimental design relates to the intentions of 
the participants. For example, the participants may not be buying something they want to 
buy. In other words, participants may not actually want to purchase a ticket to a Houston 
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Texans game, or even a professional football game. Therefore, the results may be limited 
due to participants‟ potential lack of desire to purchase tickets. 
  Finally, a potential limitation to the current study is its use of extra credit. Many 
Participants were participating in the experiment so they may in return receive extra 
credit for an undergraduate course they are enrolled in. This could cause issues with the 
reliability of the data. In other words, participants may have rushed through the study in 
order to receive the extra credit. Likewise, their responses may not actually be an 
indication of their true perceptions and behaviors. 
Future Directions 
  There are several areas of potential research pertaining to participatory pricing in 
sport events. For example, it would be interesting to see the perceptions and bidding 
behavior of consumers in a sport event ticketing scenario where the sport organization is 
a nonprofit entity. A unique example of this is occurring with Panera Bread restaurants 
in North America. Panera Bread uses PWYW pricing in select restaurants and gives all 
their profits in these restaurants to non-profit charities (N Boodhoo, 2012). Therefore, it 
would be interesting to see if consumers are willing to pay more or purchase more in the 
future when the profits go toward a charitable cause (i.e. cause-related sporting event, 
non-profit sponsors race, etc.). It may be likely consumers are drawing on altruistic 
feelings, and could be explained by the goodwill effect. The goodwill effect has been 
investigated in sport sponsorship (e.g. Meenaghan, 2001), and found to be a key 
component in explaining the behavior of sport consumers. For example, how would 
consumers differ in their perceptions and behaviors if faced with a PWYW strategy 
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where the profits go to a charitable organization, versus a PWYW strategy where the 
profits go to a for-profit corporation (i.e. professional sport team)?  
Furthermore, it would be interesting to see what role loyalty plays in consumers‟ 
bidding behavior. For example, in the current study prices were not significantly 
different between the fixed price and PWYW treatments. This could suggest that 
consumers may set reasonable prices in the PWYW scenarios. However, when taking a 
closer look at the distribution of the prices in the PWYW treatment (M = $99.83, SD = 
62.008), the data seems to be positively skewed. According to Hair et al. (1998), this 
indicates that there are few values that are large. On the other hand, the fixed price was 
only slightly negatively skewed (M = $101.71, SD = 27.636). According to Hair et al. 
(1998), this indicates that there are few values that are small. These results might suggest 
PWYW may have only a few participants the offer large sums while many offer small 
amounts. According to Kim et al. (2009) and Kim et al. (2010), consumers are more 
likely to revisit the establishment following a participatory pricing experience, as well as 
pay more for the good or service. Based on the findings in the current study, and the 
findings in other PWYW studies (Kim et al. 2009, Kim et al. 2010), future research 
could investigate the antecedent relationship the consumer has with the firm. Would the 
consumer‟s loyalty influence bidding behavior? Would it effect satisfaction with the 
purchase process? Would it influence perceptions of value differently than non-loyal 
purchasers? 
Finally, yield management has been applied to practices in the tourism industry. 
Perdue (2002) suggested that there are key criteria for yield management to be 
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successful. First, yield management needs “a time-perishable, relatively fixed capacity” 
(Perdue, 2002, p. 16). This is applicable to the sport event industry; events are 
perishable, once the event has occurred it cannot be consumed again. It also has a fixed 
capacity to do it constraints on space. In other words, a stadium can only accommodate a 
finite number of fans. Second, yield management requires a setting where there is 
“cyclical or fluctuating demand” (Perdue, 2002, p. 16). According to Rascher et al. 
(2007), demand for sporting events fluctuates based on characteristics of the game. 
Therefore, sport events meet this key criterion. Third, yield management requires 
“multiple market segments that have difference purchase processes and elasticities” 
(Perdue, 2002, p. 16). Price tiers at sporting events often meet the needs and wants of 
various consumer segments with varying spending power. Fourth, yield management 
requires “a combination of low marginal sales costs and high fixed costs for capacity” 
(Perdue, 2002, p. 16). It has been suggested that sport events also have a low marginal 
cost until the facility is full (Alexander, 2001; Leeds & Von Allmen, 2011). Finally, 
yield management requires “a „price structure‟ whereby different market segments pay 
different prices for essentially the same service product consumed at essentially the same 
time” (Perdue, 2002, p. 16). Sport events fulfill this requirement with their 
implementation of ticket price tiers. In addition, sport event fans essentially consumer 
the same product (game) at the same time. However, some may argue their product  
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changes based on the experience of the fan. Due to the compatibility of yield 
management and sport events, it would be interesting to see how this management 
strategy would work for price setting. For example, could sport organizations implement 
a yield management system that includes innovative pricing strategies currently being 
used in the sport industry (i.e. participatory pricing, dynamic pricing, variable ticket 
pricing). In other words, what is the best way for an organization to assess demand, pick 
a specific time period and target segment, then set their pricing strategy according to 
those characteristics; increasing price as demand increase? This would include 
discussions of price premiums. For example, research may seek to determine if yield 
management is an effective way to raise or lower ticket prices based on demand. Rascher 
et al. (2007) attempted to investigate how variable ticket pricing can measure demand 
based on price changes. However, the implementation of yield management in the sport 
marketing literature is scarce. 
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CHAPTER VI 
CONCLUSION 
  This study is important because it is the first to investigate participatory pricing 
in the sport industry. Due to the current use of the mechanism in sport and entertainment 
events, there is a gap in the literature that this study has begun to address. The findings 
suggest that participatory pricing strategies influence consumer perceptions (i.e. price 
fairness and perceived value) and behaviors (purchase intentions and willingness-to-
pay). Specifically, the current study suggests that PWYW is able to increase consumer 
perceived value and final price paid more than the NYOP. Conversely, NYOP is able to 
influence the consumer willingness-to-pay more than PWYW. Finally, PWYW and 
traditional fixed price strategies did not significantly differ on any dependent variable in 
this study. This suggests that if teams wish to implement a promotional pricing strategy 
that does not negatively affect their perceptions of value for the ticket, while giving 
control to the consumer, participatory pricing may be an option. This option would be 
most successful for sport marketers who have an excess supply of inventory (tickets) and 
a low marginal cost (events). This study helps future research investigating participatory 
pricing mechanisms in sport by providing a foundational exploratory base in which to 
launch further inquiries.  
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APPENDIX A 
INFORMATION PAGE 
You have been selected to participate in a study examining the perceptions of pricing 
strategies used in sport event ticketing. 
 
If you agree to participate in this study, you will be asked to answer various questions on 
your perceptions pricing strategies for sport event tickets.  The questionnaire will take 
approximately ten (10) to fifteen (15) minutes to complete. There are minimal risks 
associated with this study (none foreseeable). Although there may not be tangible 
compensation for your participation in this study, the benefits of participating include the 
opportunity to critically reflect upon the use pricing strategies for sport event tickets. 
 
Participation in this study is completely voluntary your identity will remain anonymous. 
Your decision to participate will not affect your current or future relations with Texas 
A&M University. If you decide to participate, you may refuse to answer any of the 
questions asked. You may also withdraw from the study at anytime without damaging 
your relations with Texas A&M University. 
 
For additional questions or concerns please contact: 
 
Jason Reese   
254-295-5514     
jreese@umhb.edu    
 
This research study has been reviewed by the Human Subjects' Protection Program 
and/or the Institutional Review Board at Texas A&M University.  For research-related 
problems or questions regarding your rights as a research participant, you can contact 
these offices at (979)458-4067 or irb@tamu.edu. 
 
Before you can continue onto the study, please be sure you have read and understood the 
potential risks and benefits for your participation, as well as your rights as a potential 
participant. In addition, before you can participant in the study, please acknowledge you 
are 18 years old, or older. 
 
 
By checking the box I am acknowledging the potential risks and benefits of 
participation, as well as my rights. In addition, I confirm that I am 18 years old, or older.   
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APPENDIX B 
QUESTIONNAIRE  
Price Fairness: 
After reviewing these scenarios, please answer the following statements. Before you 
answer, think about the purchase experience you just had. 
1) The terms of this event promoter are fair. 
2) The procedure of buying these tickets from the event promoter is fair. 
3) My involvement in setting the price caused me to feel the price I received was 
fair. 
Perceived Value: 
After reviewing these scenarios, please answer the following statements. Before you 
answer, think about the purchase experience you just had. 
Quality: 
4)  The purchase was of outstanding quality 
5) The purchase was very reliable 
6) The purchase was very dependable 
7) The purchase was very consistent 
Emotional Response 
8) The purchase made me feel good 
9) The purchase gave me pleasure 
10) The purchase gave me a sense of joy 
11) The purchase makes me feel delighted 
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12) The purchase gave me happiness 
Monetary Price 
13) The ticket was a good buy 
14) The ticket is worth the money 
15) The ticket is fairly priced 
16) The ticket is reasonably priced 
17) The ticket is economical 
18) The ticket appears to be a good bargain 
Reputation 
19) The team has a good reputation 
20) The team is well respected 
21) The team is well thought of 
22) The team has status 
23) The team is reputable 
Behavioral Response 
24) The ticket was an easy buy 
25) The ticket required little energy to purchase 
26) The ticket was easy to shop for 
27) The ticket required little effort to buy 
28) The ticket was easily bought 
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Willingness-to-Pay 
We wish to know how much sports fans value their tickets. One way to find out the 
value of things, like a sport event ticket, is to ask what is the most people would pay for 
it. Before you answer, think about the purchase experience you just had. What is the 
most you would pay for these event tickets?  
29) Please select the maximum amounts that you are sure you would be prepared to 
pay. 
a. $0 
b. $10 
c. $20 
d. …Increments of $10 until…. 
e. Over $360 
Purchase Intentions: 
After reviewing these scenarios, please answer the following statements. Before you 
answer, think about the purchase experience you just had. 
30)  I consider these types of events as my first choice for my entertainment dollar. 
31)  I will likely attend more events of this kind in the next few years. 
32) There is a good chance I will buy tickets using a method similar to the method I 
encountered (if available) 
 
 
 
  
132 
 
Demographics: 
Please select the most appropriate answer to the following questions:  
33)  What best describes your age? 
________________ 
34)  What best describes your gender? 
a. Female 
b. Male 
35)  What best describes your ethnicity? 
a. African American 
b. Asian or Asian American 
c. Hispanic 
d. Native American 
e. White, non-Hispanic 
f. Other 
(Note: All items in this questionnaire are based on a 7-point Likert scale, unless 
otherwise noted) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
